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Abstract 
 
 
Using a large, unique, firm-level dataset from the Chinese manufacturing sector, 
we study important factors that are related to emission intensity for three 
pollutants in China – sulfur dioxide, wastewater, and soot. Our main findings are 
as follows: 1) compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), both foreign-owned 
firms and domestic public-listed firms exhibit less intensive pollutant emissions; 
2) firms in regions with less local protection have lower pollution intensity; 3) 
better property rights protection is negatively correlated with pollutant discharge 
over and beyond the national standards; and 4) larger firms, firms in industries 
that export more, and firms with more educated employees pollute less. These 
results suggest that China should not target foreign firms more harshly in its 
effort to reduce industrial pollution. Better institutions in the form of more 
effective law enforcement and lower entry barriers across regional markets are 
also means of curbing China’s pressing environmental problems during its 
current stage of economic development.  
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1. Introduction 
China has been undergoing a rapid, large-scale economic expansion that has 
almost no historical parallel. However, its economic miracle has also made it one of the 
largest polluters in the world. According to a World Bank report, many newly established 
heavy industry plants in China do not control pollution as effectively as factories in other 
parts of the world.
1
 The deteriorating environmental quality has attracted great attention 
globally,
2
 and there have been rising concerns whether the remarkable growth of China 
can be sustained in the long run if the pollution continues to worsen. While policymakers 
are urged to take serious action to tackle the pollution problems, for any policy to be 
effective, a first and foremost question is about targeting: What kinds of manufacturers 
tend to pollute more and thus should be regulated more intensively? However, due to the 
lack of high-quality data, there have been very few studies that systematically investigate 
the determinants of industrial pollution in China.  
This research aims to fill in the gap in the literature by compiling a unique firm-
level dataset to empirically explore the factors that are associated with pollution intensity 
in China’s manufacturing sectors. This unique dataset has several appealing advantages: 
(1) it contains information on pollution emissions at the plant level, enabling us to 
include a rich set of heterogeneous firm-level characteristics  that have to be omitted in 
the industry- or regional- level analyses; (2) compare with the pollution fee paid by a firm 
                                                          
1
 See The New York Times, August 26, 2007. The article offers more details from the World Bank 
report, such that “Chinese steel makers, on average, use one-fifth more energy per ton than the international 
average. Cement manufacturers need 45% more power, and ethylene producers need 70% more than 
producers elsewhere.” Likewise, “Chinese industry uses 4 to 10 times more water per unit of production 
than the average in industrialized nations, according to the World Bank.” 
2
 In January 2013, Beijing drew global media attention due to being encased in thick smog with air 
pollution hazard levels (according to standards set by the United States Environmental Protection Agency) 
soaring. See The New York Times, January 30, 2013. 
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that is often used as a proxy for pollution intensity in previous studies, the quantity of 
pollutants discharged from each plant recorded in our dataset provides a direct and 
arguably better measure of pollution;
3
(3) the dataset allows us to examine the 
determinants of several different types of pollutants, as it has an extensive coverage of 
pollutants emission information, ranging from waste water (such as chemical oxygen 
demand and ammonia nitrogen pollutant concentrations), air pollution (such as sulfur 
dioxide, burned dust, and industrial soot emission concentration), solid waste to noise;  
(4) unlike other survey data that mostly limits to a specific region of China, this database 
is nationally representative, covering all of the manufacturing sectors (SIC 4-digit) across 
all provinces in China; and (5) as the survey on plant pollution was conducted in 2006 
and 2007, when China’s stock exchanges had well developed and its efforts on property 
rights protection had also been implemented for a while, it enables us to test the effects of 
various ownership types (such as public-listed firms) and local governance on pollution.      
In particular, we examine how a firm’s pollution intensity is related to the 
following several major factors. The first factor is firm ownership. One debate is about 
whether the majority of the pollution is produced by the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
or foreign-owned firms. While no one denies that SOEs are a big source of industrial 
pollution, foreign firms are often blamed as well and sometimes are even accused of 
                                                          
3
 The current levy system functions as a two-part tariff system with a uniform rate for within-
standard emissions and increasing rates for above-standard emissions. However, even with a national 
standard on pollution emission, local authorities can vary the levy level significantly, reducing or even 
eliminating the discharge fees at the discretion of local regulators under certain inspections (Wang and 
Wheeler, 2005). This has caused significant variations in pollution discharge fees across regions of China, 
given identified factory and pollutant emissions. As a result, using pollution fees as a measure of pollutant 
discharge across China is rather ambiguous and would cause substantial bias in our analysis. 
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deliberately relocating heavy-polluting industries to China.
4
 However, defenders of 
foreign firms argue that multinational enterprises often care about their reputation (a 
negative image in one country may hurt business opportunities in other countries) and 
would take more responsibility to protect local environment than domestic firms do. 
Likewise, public-listed companies are also supposed to take extra corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) on pollution controls because they are subject to the scrutiny of 
public investors. A countervailing argument is that since pollution reduction is costly and 
may eventually harm a firm’s profitability, listed-firms may not have strong incentives to 
pursue the CSR on environmental protection (Friedman, 1970). We empirically examine 
these competing arguments by comparing six different types of ownership of Chinese 
manufacturing firms and use the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as the benchmark group. 
Our regression results show that both foreign-owned and public-listed companies have 
lower pollution intensity relative to SOEs.  
 The second potential factor that affects industrial pollution is local protectionism. 
Although the national environmental regulations (such as the Pollution Discharge Levy 
System) have been implemented in China since the 1980s, this system does not give 
enterprises enough incentives to control their emissions (Florig, Spofford, Ma and Ma, 
2005). It has been well documented in the literature that environmental policies are 
poorly implemented in developing countries often because of malfunctioned institutions 
(e.g. Dasgupta, 2000; Bell et al., 2002). In the case of China, in order to maintain local 
tax revenue, create job opportunities, and promote economic growth, local governments 
                                                          
4
 In 2007, the Chinese government found that Unilever China and the China branch of Hitachi 
Construction Machinery Co. were discharging wastewater with higher chemical content than permitted 
(China Daily, September 17, 2007). 
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have incentives to support local manufactures (many of which are SOEs) through all 
kinds of favorable policies, including tolerating their heavy pollution and even protecting 
them from being penalized for making excessive pollution. For example, Lo et al. (2006) 
argue that the pervasive “pro-growth” priorities of local governments undermine the 
implementation of environmental policies in China. A testable hypothesis for our analysis 
is that firms located at places with stronger local protection will produce more pollution. 
Our empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis.    
Third, we hypothesize that better property rights protection is associated with less 
pollution intensity. The Coasian theory implies that well-defined property rights can help 
reduce or even eliminate externalities such as pollution (Coase, 1960; Coase, 1990). A 
well-defined and enforced legal system enables individuals to sue the polluting parties 
more effectively, thereby discouraging pollution.
 5
 The Chinese government recently 
renewed its efforts to strengthen property rights policies and law enforcement to address 
the weak institution issue. Therefore, it is of particular interest to examine the effect of 
property rights protection on pollution. We offer evidence that is consistent with 
theoretical predictions that better property rights protection is negatively associated with 
pollution intensity, especially when the pollutants discharge level is over the national 
standard.  
 Finally, we examine the relationship between pollution and some other firm 
performance and characteristics, such as firm exporting activities, firm size, and staffs’ 
education level. There is some evidence in the literature suggesting that these factors 
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 Farzin and Bond (2006) document that high-quality political institutions respond favorably to 
environmental demands from the population. 
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could also matter for industrial pollution. For example, a recent study by Holladay (2010) 
finds that exporters generate significantly less pollution than their non-exporting 
competitors in the same industry, even after controlling for productivity. Weersink and 
Raymond (2007) argue that more educated people tend to be more capable of expressing 
their voices or appealing through formal institutions when their interests are negatively 
affected by pollution. Our empirical analysis finds consistent results that smaller firms, 
firms that export less, and firms with less educated employees tend to have more 
pollution intensity.  
Overall, our results suggest that, to effectively cut industrial pollution in China, 
environmental regulations should more target SOEs and medium- and small-sized 
manufactures. Meanwhile, reducing local protectionism and/or improving the legal 
institution is also a promising direction. It is worth to note that after a series of sensitivity 
tests, the overall patterns generated from our empirical analyses are generally robust 
towards alternative sample and model specifications. However, because we cannot 
completely guard against potential biases resulting from omitted variables or 
measurement issues due to data limitation, one should be cautious when interpreting our 
estimates as true causal effects.  
Despite of its limitation, this study contributes to the literature in two important 
ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this study is among the first to examine the 
determinants of firm pollution intensity using large-scale firm-level discharges that cover 
all of the manufacturing industries in China.
6
 We contribute to the small but growing 
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 The only paper we are aware of that also uses nationwide plant-level emission data is by Wang and 
Wheeler (2005). They estimate an econometric model in which firm-level pollution levy rates and 
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literature on the determinants of industrial pollution in China (e.g. Wang and Jin, 2002; 
Dean and Lovely, 2008; Liang, 2008; Dean, Lovely, and Wang, 2009), and as mentioned 
above, we improve over previous studies by using more direct measures of plant-level 
pollution based on a nationally representative sample. In addition, the paper also 
supplements the literature on China’s environmental regulations (Wang and Wheeler, 
2005; Almond et al., 2009),
7
 and the literature on the socioeconomic consequences of 
pollution in China (Ebenstein, 2012).
8
 Second, while previous research on industrial 
pollution mostly focus on the individual effects of trade, ownership or FDI on pollution at 
the country- or industry-level,
9
 we are among the first to systematically examine the 
effects of all of these factors at the plant level, and add to the literature the effects of local 
protectionism and property rights protection on industrial pollution. By investigating six 
different types of firm ownership, we document that foreign-owned firms have less 
pollution intensity than SOEs. This result is consistent with a few recent studies on 
Chinese pollution that show the beneficial effects of openness.
10
 We also offer new 
                                                                                                                                                                             
emissions are jointly determined and demonstrate that China’s levy system is a significant pollution 
deterrent. 
7
  Wang and Wheeler (2005) document the effectiveness of levy system on pollution control. 
Almond et al. (2009) assesses the role of heating entitlements set by the Chinese government in its central 
planning period (1950-1980) and finds that the heating policy causes the total suspended particulates level 
particularly high in the north China where heating is allowed under the government policy.  
8
 Ebenstein (2012) studies pollution across China’s river basins and finds that a one-grade 
deterioration in water quality increases the digestive cancer death rate by 9.7%. 
9
 Among the early pioneering studies, Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) and Copeland and 
Taylor (2004, 2005) find that the overall effect of trade liberalization is beneficial. Similarly, Frankel and 
Rose (2005) use cross-sectional country data and solve the potential endogeneity problem in previous 
studies. They find little evidence that foreign trade has a detrimental effect on environment. In another 
important paper, Javorcik and Wei (2003) find no evidence of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis using firm-
level data from 25 transitional economies. 
10
  Using city-level data for the period from 1996 to 2003, Liang (2008) finds a negative correlation 
between FDI inflow and air pollution, suggesting that the overall effect of FDI is beneficial to China’s 
environment; Wang and Jin (2002) find similar results and argue that foreign firms pollute less due to 
energy efficiency and the superior technology they use; Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009) revisit the 
pollution-haven hypothesis, and document that equity joint ventures in highly polluting industries funded 
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evidence that public-listed companies in China take more social responsibilities on 
pollution control than SOEs. Using direct measures of industry-level air and water 
pollution generated by Chinese manufactures from 1995 to 2004, Dean and Lovely 
(2008) document that Chinese exports are less water pollution-intensive, and generally 
less air pollution-intensive than Chinese imports.
11
 In contrast, we directly calculate the 
firm-level export ratio, and from a different angel we show the beneficial effects of 
exporting on environmental quality in China. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The previous section reviews 
the research on pollution and environmental protection. Section 2 provides institutional 
background. Section 3 discusses theories on determinants of pollution emission and 
develops our hypotheses accordingly. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents 
empirical analysis and results. Section 6 provides additional discussions on data and 
measurement issues, and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Institutional Background 
The evolution of China’s legislation and institutional development on 
environmental protection can be traced back to 1979, when the state council first 
proposed that pollution charges be written into the Environmental Protection Law. This is 
considered a milestone in China’s environmental legal system. Following the 
implementation of the pollution charges across some cities, the state council further 
                                                                                                                                                                             
through non-ethnically Chinese countries are not attracted by weak environmental standards, but those 
funded by ethnical Chinese sources are. 
11
 They interpret their results as evidence of the composition effect – a result of trade-induced 
specialization in China toward clean, labor-intensive processing activities and away from dirty, capital-
intensive production – that has favored China’s environment. 
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issued the Tentative Provisions on Pollution Charge (the State Council Order No. 21) in 
1982, which defines the purpose behind the formula of the pollution charge and the 
management of the fund generated by pollution fees. This levy system covered almost all 
of China by 1996. However, due to the low levy rate, many enterprises have chosen to 
discharge pollutants directly instead of performing pollution control (such as installing 
new facilities to reduce pollution). Thus, with the rapid expansion of the manufacturing 
industries, China’s pollution problem has actually become more serious. In 2003, a new 
pollution charge policy was brought into effect. It not only charges for pollution 
emissions over the standard, but also within the standard. Furthermore, this new policy 
covers almost all polluting elements discharged by enterprises ranging from wastewater, 
and industrial air to solid waste and noise. Since then, the pollution fee has increased 
rapidly. From 2003 to 2006, the total pollution fee collected each year has increased from 
RMB6 billion to RMB14 billion, an average increase rate of about 33% for each year.  
In 1988, the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA),
12
 which is 
responsible for the implementation of pollution charges, was formed along with many 
local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) being set up throughout the nation. Over 
the past 30 years, many environmental protection organizations besides the EPBs have 
also been formed at both the national and local (provincial, city, or county) levels. 
According to the data released by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), 
China had established 11,321 environmental protection institutions by the end of 2006, 
                                                          
12
 It was replaced by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China during the March 2008 
National People’s Congress sessions in Beijing. 
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with 393 at the national and provincial levels.
13
 Due to the differentiations in economic 
and technological development across regions and areas, local government and 
authorities are encouraged to make local regulations and rules that adapt to specific local 
situations. Of course, these rules and regulations cannot be in conflict with those at the 
national level. China has established or passed one environmental protection law, 26 
environmental individual laws, over 50 environmental protection administrative 
regulations and over 1,600 local environmental decrees and rules.
14
 However, even with 
the relatively complete environmental legal system and growing number of 
administrative sectors, China is suffering from the poor implementation and enforcement 
of these laws and regulations. In reality, local government officials can “exercise 
considerable discretion over how to identify factories as non-compliant, how to prioritize 
their enforcement efforts and how to enforce compliance” (Tilt, 2007). The interference 
of local governments has caused substantial ambiguity over how the levy should be 
implemented in real practice. Some EPBs are also accused of corruption on the 
distortions in using these pollution discharge fees. Overall, the insufficiency of 
supervision capacity and the poor law enforcement accompanied by administrative 
problems have seriously detracted from the effectiveness of local pollution control.  
Meanwhile, despite the fact that public participation and information sharing have 
been greatly promoted by the Chinese government, China’s public participation rate on 
environmental protection is still very low and the information sharing is far from 
effective or efficient. The Environmental Protection Law clearly stipulates that 
                                                          
13
 China Environment Statistics Year Book, 1992-2007, Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
China. Environmental Science Press, Beijing. 
14
 See “Water control in China: Review of laws, regulations and policies and their implementation” 
by the Economic Analysis Team, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), April 17, 2009.  
11 
 
government should release environmental information to the public, but the majority of 
local residents are often unaware of the fact that the big construction projects in their 
neighborhoods might be harmful. The SEPA and many local government environmental 
protection organizations have opened their own websites to let people access statistical 
data, news, legal documents, and newly passed protection rules and decrees directly 
through the Internet. Nonetheless, the real experience of searching through this 
information shows that pollution data are still very limited to the public and neither 
detailed nor timely. 
3. Hypothesis Development  
In this section, we develop several hypotheses regarding some important factors 
that may affect industrial pollution. It is worth noting that, although our discussions are 
rather exploratory given limited guidance from prior research about the determinants of 
pollution in China, these hypotheses build a good starting point for our empirical analysis 
as well as future research.  
First, the literature suggests that firm ownership could be a primary determinant 
of pollution (Talukdar and Meisner, 2001; Wang and Jin, 2002; Wang and Wheeler, 
2005). One possible distinction is between domestic firms (especially SOEs) and foreign 
firms. Intuitively, based on the “Pollution Haven” hypothesis (i.e. polluting industries 
tend to move from developed countries to less-regulated developing countries), foreign-
owned firms may pollute more relative to SOEs. But some empirical studies draw the 
opposite conclusions, arguing that foreign firms may generate less pollution because of 
their more advanced technology. For example, based on an analysis of U.S. outbound 
investment, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) document that foreign enterprises are more 
12 
 
energy efficient and use cleaner types of energy than state-owned factories. Wang and Jin 
(2002) also find that foreign firms in China pollute less than domestic firms thanks to 
better energy efficiency and the superior technology they use. Besides, multinational 
firms may also have stronger incentives than SOEs to control pollution, worrying that a 
negative image in one country (such as polluting the host country) could dampen the 
firm’s business opportunities in other countries. While it is unclear a prior whether 
foreign firms tend to pollute more or less than SOEs, we propose the following two 
competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Other things being equal, foreign-owned enterprises have lower 
pollution intensity (pollutant discharge per unit of sales) than SOEs. 
Hypothesis 1a’: Other things being equal, foreign-owned enterprises have higher 
pollution intensity (pollutant discharge per unit of sales) than SOEs.  
Another dimension of ownership we attempt to explore is comparing public-listed 
firms with (unlisted) SOEs. In general, firms have both disincentives and incentives to 
control pollution. On the one hand, higher costs (e.g., installation of pollution-reduction 
devices) incurred to control pollution will negatively affect a firm’s industrial activities 
(Telle, K., 2006). Because additional spending on pollution reduction could eventually 
harm the firm’s profitability and comparative advantage, firms should have few 
incentives to pursue the CSR on environmental protection (Friedman, 1970). On the other 
hand, albeit costly, controlling pollution may benefit the firm through enhancing its 
reputation to attract more investors and/or customers, eventually making the firm more 
profitable (Oberndorfer, et al., 2013). Such reputation gains could be particularly high for 
public-listed companies that are subject to the scrutiny of public investors. Previous 
13 
 
evidence suggests that industrial accidents with environmental consequences are 
associated with a significant drop in stock market returns.
15
 Capelle-Blancard and Laguna 
(2010) show that the market loss associated with one plant accident such as the explosion 
in chemical plants can be between $164 million to $1.82 billion U.S. dollars. They also 
find that the stock market loss is more severe for firms with poor environmental and 
safety records. Using data from the Korean market, Dasgupta et al. (2000) also find stock 
market penalties for environmental violations and point out that such penalties are higher 
in developing countries than those in developed countries. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
public-listed firms may have stronger incentives to control pollution because the 
reputation gains from an environmental-friendly image may well exceed the pollution-
reduction costs. We form the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b: Other things being equal, public-listed companies has lower 
pollution intensity than (unlisted) SOEs. 
The second major determinant of pollution examined in the paper is local 
government protection. One notable feature of China’s economic reforms over the past 
three decades is the transition from a highly centralized fiscal system to a gradually 
decentralized system. As the fiscal decentralization allows local governments to keep part 
of the tax revenue, it gives local governments strong incentives to maintain the local tax 
base by protecting local firms against foreign and/or interregional competitions (Ping, 
1996; Bai et al., 2004). In addition, pollution by local industries is also tolerated by local 
governments,
16
 who rely on these industries to contribute tax, create job opportunities, 
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 For a summary, please see Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010). 
16
  Even when local governments regulate polluting plants, they often lower the environmental 
standards towards local firms that they intend to protect. 
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promote economic growth and maintain social stabilities (Bai et al., 2004). In fact, local 
protectionism is deeply rooted because many polluting industries have strong ties with 
local governments. Sometimes, even government officials themselves (or their family) 
are owner (or co-owner) of the polluting plants. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many 
environmental pollution cases can be attributed to the abuse of power by local 
government officials who blatantly allow pollution to be produced.
17
 Naturally, we 
expect that stronger local protection will lead to more pollution from local firms: 
Hypothesis 2: Other things being equal, local protectionism is positively 
associated with the intensity of pollution emissions. 
The third factor that could influence industrial pollution is the strength of law 
enforcement. In China, environmental officials have little power over bureaucracy: Firms 
in violation of environmental protection laws do not receive due punishment due to the 
political connections and local protection we discussed earlier. According to the Coasian 
hypothesis, good property right protection can reduce or even eliminate externalities, 
such as pollution. A well-defined and enforced legal system enables individuals to sue the 
polluting parties effectively. Ajuzie and Altobello (1997) argue that the assignment of 
property rights leads to efficient resource allocation, increases productivity, and promotes 
environmental quality. The high variations in the effectiveness of the court system across 
Chinese cities, as reflected in the 2006 World Bank survey, enable us to explore such 
relationship. We summarize the above discussion with the following hypothesis: 
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  Deputy Director of the State Environment Protection Administration (now the Ministry of 
Environment Protection), PAN Yue, stated that “The governments’ refusal or failure to fulfill 
environmental responsibilities has seriously set back China’s environmental protection efforts” (Xinhua 
News Agency, February 27, 2007, SPEA: Pollution Control Requires Accountability). 
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Hypothesis 3.: Other things being equal, better property rights protection is 
negatively associated with the intensity of firm pollution emissions. 
Next we hypothesize that pollution is affected by a firm’s exporting activities and 
its size. Melitz (2003) incorporates firm productivity heterogeneity into the Krugman 
(1979) monopolistic competition framework, which brought an extensive trade literature 
to study the influence of firm heterogeneity on trade behavior. In this dynamic industry 
model, firms choose to export when their productivity exceeds a certain threshold that 
enables them to generate enough profits to cover the exporting costs. Empirical studies 
have largely supported the view that exporters tend to be larger and more productive than 
their competitors in domestic markets. Furthermore, a firm’s heterogeneity in production 
has been shown to affect its pollution emission intensity. Cole et al. (2005) find that 
emissions are positively correlated with capital intensity and negatively correlated with 
firm size and productivity. Holladay (2010) shows that exporters are larger than non-
exporters due to their productivity advantage; they also generate significantly fewer and 
less toxic pollution than non-exporters in the same industry do. Moreover, since small-
sized firms face more financial constraint to adopt new technologies or update their old 
machines, to compete with large firms and make a profit, they may maintain dirty and 
outdated technologies to save costs. The lack of technological flexibility will seriously 
affect the effective and efficient use of energy and thus lead to more intensive pollution. 
Together with the above discussion, we expect that the intensity of pollution emissions is 
negatively associated with firm export and firm size. 
In addition, pollution intensity is also likely to depend on the education level of 
local residents. People with more education are more likely to be concerned with their 
16 
 
living standards, including the quality of their drinking water and air. They are not only 
expected to be more aware of the harmful effects of pollution, but also expected to obtain 
greater welfare surplus by taking responsibility for environmental protection to improve 
ambient air and water quality. As Weersink and Raymond (2007) document, people with 
a higher education level tend to be more informative and capable of appealing through 
formal institutional channels when their interests are potentially harmed by pollution. We 
use the employees’ education level as a proxy for the surrounding residence education 
level since they tend to live near the polluting plant. Besides, many manufacturing firms 
are very passive in carrying out environmental protection schemes, partly because of their 
profit-maximization-driven goals, and partly because of their own employees’ ignorance 
of its importance. We therefore expect that firms with more educated employees will 
pollute less than their competitors, all other things being equal. 
Finally, we argue that pollution may be associated with competition. Market 
competition may affect a firm’s incentive to reduce pollution. In a more competitive 
market, firms are forced to cut costs and thus are more likely to adopt dirty technology. 
Moreover, the firm may not have enough resources to adopt cleaner technology due to its 
lower level of profits as a result of fierce competition. In contrast, competition in the 
product and labor markets may crowd out the inefficient firms as competition could 
reduce the output of the least efficient firms. Therefore, the overall effect of competition 
on pollution is ambiguous. 
4. Data and Sample Selection 
4.1 Data sources 
17 
 
The data used in this study are compiled from five sources: (1) the Pollution Data 
from the Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP, 2006, 2007) of China; (2) the 
Industry Enterprise Dataset from  the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006, 
2007); (3) the World Bank Survey on Governance and Investment Climate Index in 120 
Cities in China (2006); (4) the NERI (National Economic Research Institute) Index of 
Marketization of China’s Provinces 2006 Report; and (5) the 2005 Economic Census in 
China. 
The pollution dataset is provided by China’s MEP covering a nationwide number 
of 2,862 firms for 2006 and 4,261 firms for 2007 (with 2,486 firms in both years), from 
SIC 4-digit manufacturing industries.
18
 This database covers all provinces, with plants 
considered as more important enterprises that are under direct monitoring of the MEP. 
Even though the database is only a sample of the universe of Chinese firms, an 
examination of the plants distribution shows that the spatial distribution of plants in this 
database roughly matches with the general pattern of industrial development in China.
19
 
Given the importance of the firms being examined, this database is the one that probably 
has the best coverage and contains the most comprehensive and detailed information of 
Chinese manufacturing pollution among relevant studies. 
In practice, the MEP requires that the manufacturing plants self-report their 
emissions, but it will conduct monitoring and surprise inspections. False reporting will be 
penalized upon detection. During the survey, each manufacturing plant files an emission 
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  The original database contains 5,416 firms for 2006 and 6,100 firms for 2007 (with 3,634 firms 
in both years). But as our study requires each plant has at least one of the three types of pollutants emission 
information (i.e. sulfur dioxide, waste water, and soot), we start with a smaller sample.  
19
 In Appendix Figure 1, we show that the share of the number of firms in each province in our 
pollution database is highly correlated with the share of the industrial GDP for each province. 
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form to provide its last year’s pollutant discharge information. This emission form is very 
detailed and asks for the following: 1) basic information about the plant (including 
detailed plant address, contact information, number of employees in the environmental 
protection sector, year of establishment, number of production days for the previous year, 
total number of employees by the end of the previous year, plant scale, subordination of 
organization, ownership type, industry category, and value of gross output); 2) the value 
and capacity of the pollutant disposal equipment and the related expenditure and amount 
(at both aggregate and separate levels for each pollutant); 3) the volume of water used for 
production, volume of waste water discharge, and waste water pollutant concentrations 
(including chemical oxygen demand and ammonia nitrogen); 4) the volume of waste gas 
discharge and air pollutant concentrations (including sulfur dioxide, burned dust, and 
industrial soot) in the waste gas; 5) the weight of solid waste discharge; 6) ambient noise 
pollution; 7) discharge levels over the national quota for each pollutant; 8) total pollution 
fees paid in the previous year; 9) diagrams of production process; and 10) emission time.  
It should be noted that this pollution dataset is collected at the manufacturing 
plant level. In other words, each firm in the dataset represents one manufacturing plant in 
one city with detailed plant-level emission data applied to that city.
20
 In addition, the 
dataset contains extensive pollutant emissions information ranging from waste water and 
air pollution to noise. In this study we mainly focus on three pollutants: sulfur dioxide, 
waste water, and soot, for three reasons: 1) they are considered the most threatening 
environmental pollution generated by China’s manufacturing sector; 2) they have been 
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 Because each firm may include multiple plants and these plants may not be independent of each 
other, studying plant-level emissions may overstate the statistical significance. However, we carefully 
checked the data we used and did not find any instance of multiple plants belonging to one firm in our 
sample. Therefore, our data should be free of this measurement problem.  
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used as major indicators to measure environmental pollution in many countries; and 3) 
the information provided for these three pollutants is much more complete than that for 
other pollutant types in the dataset. To check whether our results are sensitive to the 
choice of pollutants, we also study other indicators such as oxynitride, chemical oxygen 
demand, and ammonia nitrogen in Section 6.1. 
To obtain more firm- and city-level characteristics, we use the plant’s name (in 
Chinese) and its location to link the pollution dataset to the Industry Enterprise Dataset 
and the World Bank survey databases by hand.
21
 The Industry Enterprise Dataset (2006, 
2007), covering firms with annual sales over five million RMB from all manufacturing 
sectors, was compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. It collected almost 
all important aspects of a firm’s operation. We use a subset of this database that includes 
only manufacturing firms in our MEP dataset. The detailed firm-level information 
includes ownership types, industry classification, city code, date of establishment, total 
assets, sales, employee education, outputs, inputs, taxes, and profits, etc.
22
 The World 
Bank survey, conducted in 2006, contains information about the degree of property right 
protection, the effectiveness of the court of law, and the enterprise tax burden relief index 
in 120 cities in China, among other things.
23
 The measurement for local protection is 
                                                          
21
 We manually match the pollution dataset and the Industry Enterprise Dataset based on firm names 
and location in both databases. The World Bank Survey on Governance and Investment Climate Index in 
120 Cities in China (2006) contains only city-level information, so this dataset is merged with the pollution 
dataset based on each firm’s city location. Finally, the NERI (National Economic Research Institute) Index 
of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2006 Report contains province-level information, so this database is 
merged with the pollution dataset based on each firm’s province location. 
22
  The Industry Enterprise Dataset is lack of firm R&D information. We match firm R&D data using 
the First Economic Census conducted in 2005 on firm operations in 2004. 
23
 The 120 cities cover all of the provinces in mainland China except Tibet. The capital city from 
each province is included. The inclusion of additional cities for each province depends on the provincial 
GDP. The 120 cities included in this survey account for 70% - 80% of China’s GDP. 
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obtained from the 2006 NERI Marketization Index of China’s Provinces. Finally, we 
collect city-level macroeconomic variables from the Economic Census of China (2005).
24
 
After matching the five datasets we obtain a sample of 2,842 firm observations (or 
1,882 firms) across two years that covers 116 cities in China. Out of the 1,882 firms, 
there are 683 (551, 566) firms contain two years of sulfur dioxide (waste water, soot) 
discharge data.
25
 For each firm, we have information on firm characteristics such as 
pollutant discharge levels, ownership types, firm size, firm age, industry code, R&D 
expenditure, and leverage in addition to city-level variables such as GDP per capita, 
unemployment rate, population intensity, and property-right protection. The variable 
definitions are presented in the Appendix Table 1. 
 4.2 The intensity of pollutant discharge 
The intensity of pollutant discharge, our dependent variable, is calculated as the 
logarithm of the physical units of a given pollutant of a firm scaled by its annual sales. 
Table 1 presents the variation distribution of all three pollutant discharges across 
provinces. We find that coastal provinces have less air pollution on average than the non-
coastal provinces but more wastewater pollution than non-coastal provinces. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Next, we briefly discuss how some of our key variables are defined. Out of the 
2,842 firms in our sample, 2,297 reported sulfur dioxide discharges, 1,931 reported waste 
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 We have done a very careful job by merging different datasets together while they have different 
(but close) timing of data sources, but we acknowledge that there might still be concerns on data 
measurement issues given data limitation. 
25
  Our merging process requires that each firm has at least one pollutant emission information for 
one year. 
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water discharges, and 1,967 reported soot discharges. A total of 1,473 firms report 
discharge information for all three pollutants. As the summary statistics in Table 2 show, 
the intensity of sulfur dioxide discharge in our sample ranges from 0 to 1,610.35 tons per 
RMB100 million in sales (US$1 equals RMB6.5, approximately), with a mean of 51.79.
26
 
The intensity for waste water discharge ranges from 0 to 320.72 tons per RMB10,000 in 
sales, with a mean of 3.32. The intensity for soot discharge ranges from 0 to 3,893.66 
tons per RMB100 million in sales, with a mean of 36.26. Given that the median annual 
sales of the firms in our sample is RMB2.06 billion. Each year a median-sized firm will 
discharge about 1,067 tons of sulfur dioxide or 747 tons of soot into the air or 684,000 
tons of waste water into the river or sea.
 27
   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
A further examination of the sample reveals an uneven distribution of pollutant 
discharge across both areas and industries. Appendix Figure 2 shows the average of 
sulfur dioxide discharge for the 116 cities based on the 2,297 firm reports in our sample, 
as highlighted by circles. The larger the circle is, the more sulfur dioxide pollution from 
that city. The figure clearly shows that inland cities are suffering more from sulfur 
dioxide pollution than coastal cities in China. This result is consistent with our findings in 
Table 1. We further study the variation distribution of pollution across industries. As 
Figure 1 shows, the four most heavily polluted industries are pulp and paper 
                                                          
26
 In China, the levels of sulfur dioxide and soot pollution are measured in two kinds of units: the 
ambient concentration (mg/m3) or the mass emission (ton). The mg/m3 unit measures the concentration of 
air pollution from all possible sources rather than only manufacturing firms. To accurately measure the 
industry pollution, the MEP dataset used the mass emission (ton). 
27
 According to the MEP’s data, China was the largest sulfur dioxide discharge country in the world 
in 2005 with a total of 25.49 million tons of sulfur dioxide discharge. 
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manufacturing, chemicals and chemical material manufacturing, non-metal (e.g., cement) 
manufacturing, and electricity and thermal production. Combined, these four industries 
contribute to over 85% of the total pollution emissions in the sample, but they only 
account for 27.72% of the total sales of the sampled firms. 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
4.3 Other variables 
The Industry Census database defines six types of firm ownership: state-owned 
enterprises (SOE), foreign-owned enterprises (foreign), privately owned enterprises 
(private), public-listed companies (public), collectives (collectives), and non-state-owned 
limited companies (limited). These six types of ownership are mutually exclusive. SOEs 
include various types of SOES: domestic, alliances and unlisted SOEs. Foreign-owned 
enterprises include enterprises partially or wholly owned by Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan 
(HMT) and other foreign investors. Public-listed companies are domestic public-listed 
companies. Collectives include companies that are registered as collective firms or 
alliances. As Table 2 reveals, 14% of the firms in our sample are SOEs, 19% are foreign-
owned firms, 25% are privately owned firms, 11% are public-listed firms, 5% are 
collectives, and 26% are domestic non-state-owned limited firms. 
Besides the series of ownership indicators, we include two key explanatory 
variables in our analysis: local protection and property right protection indices. To shield 
local enterprises from fierce competition with other cities or foreign countries, local 
governments may create a barrier to support local firms such that new entrants find it 
very difficult to enter the market with profitability. Local regulations may also be 
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implemented with extra conditions to limit new entrants. China’s auto market is a good 
example. In 2000, the Shanghai government set a levy of RMB80,000 license fee for 
each Fukang automobile registered in Shanghai to prevent an increasing market share 
gained by the Citroen joint venture based in Hubei province. In contrast, the similar 
Santana model made by the Shanghai Volkswagen company only requires a RMB20,000 
license fee. In another example also in Shanghai, the government adopts environmental 
regulations that are tailored to the technical specifications of locally produced cars, which 
have effectively prevented other car producers from entering into the market (Bai et al., 
2004).
28
 We therefore use entry barrier as a proxy for local protectionism in each city in 
China. The data comes from the NERI Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2006 
Report which measures the efforts exerted by local government to reduce local 
protectionism in product markets, particularly in the form of abolishing entry barriers to 
the local market. This report contains year 2003 to 2005 indexes at the province level. 
We use the year 2003 index in order to avoid the reverse causality problem. However, we 
do not find our basic results are changed by using year 2004 or 2005 index or the average 
of the three years data since the within province variation is small during the time span. 
The 2003 local protection index  ranges from 0.76 (Guangdong) to 9.51 (Qinghai), has a 
mean (median) of 2.52 (2.29), and a standard deviation of 1.38, with a higher value 
indicating increased entry barriers or more local protection.  
The property right protection index is derived from the World Bank Survey on 
Governance and Investment Climate Index in 120 cities in China (2006). In particular, 
the survey asks firms to answer the following question, “Among the commercial or other 
                                                          
28
 Regional Protectionism Weakening State Capacity 3/27/2011, extracted from: 
http://china.org.cn/english/2001/Mar/9673.htm 
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disputes that your company has been involved with, what has been the likelihood (in 
terms of percentage) that your company’s contractual and property rights (including 
enforcement) are protected?” This index is formed at the city level, ranging from 0.27 
(Huhehaote) to 0.98 (Hangzhou), a mean (median) of 0.65 (0.67) and a standard 
deviation of 0.17, with a higher value representing a perception of better protection of 
property rights (due to better law enforcement, for example).  
We also include a set of other firm-level variables that may affect pollutant 
discharge. These variables include export (the ratio of annual exports value to annual 
sales), education, (the percentage of employees with college and above-college degrees), 
firm profitability (return on assets or ROA), firm size, firm age, leverage, R&D expenses 
(R&D), and industry dummy variables.  
Finally, to control for some of the common features that may be shared among 
local firms, we further include a series of industry- and city-level variables. The industry-
level variables include the competition variable, measured with the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) as the sum of the squared market shares of all of the firms in the 
industry at the 4-digit SIC level. The HHI index is computed from the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NSB) Enterprise Database with the lower limit of zero representing perfect 
competition and the upper limit of 1 representing monopoly. In our sample, this index 
ranges from 0.00 to 0.58. 
To ensure that the pollutant discharge intensities of each firm are driven by the 
key explanatory variables and not others, we further include a series of city-level control 
variables: population intensity (pop_intensity), unemployment rate (unemployment), GDP 
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per capita (GDP_per_capita), and GDP per capita square (GDP_per_capita2). These 
variables measure the overall level of economic development.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Univariate analysis 
The correlation matrix between pollutant discharge and firm-level variables is 
shown in Panel A of Table 3. We determine the following: (i) the intensities of all 
pollutant discharges are positively correlated with one another; (ii) foreign-owned firms 
and domestic public-listed firms have a lower intensity of all pollutant discharges than 
SOEs; (iii) export is negatively correlated with pollution; (iv) bigger firms pollute less 
than smaller firms; and (v) the higher employees’ education levels are, the lower their 
firm’s pollutant intensities. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The correlation matrix between pollutant discharges and other variables is shown 
in Panel B of Table 3. We do not find consistent correlation between competition and 
pollution. However, we do find evidence of the following: (1) the intensity of pollutant 
discharge is positively correlated with local protection and negatively correlated with 
property right protection; (2) cities with less population density suffer from more 
pollution; (3) cities with higher unemployment rates are associated with increased 
industrial pollution; and (4) people in cities with higher GDP per capita suffer less from 
pollution. Next, we conduct a multivariate analysis. 
5.2 Basic regression: Determinants of pollution intensity 
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To examine the determinants of pollution intensity, we assume that the firm-level 
intensity of pollutant discharge is a function of firm ownership, firm-level characteristics, 
city-level characteristics, property-right protection, competition, industry fixed effects, 
year fixed effects, and an unobserved error term. 
We employ a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model to estimate the intensity 
of sulfur dioxide, waste water, and soot, respectively, as opposed to a fixed effects model 
because ownership does not change over time. The main OLS regression results are 
shown in Table 4. The robust standard errors reported here are corrected for correlation 
across firms within the same city (i.e. clustered at the city level). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
There are several interesting findings. First, the coefficients on foreign-owned 
firms are negative and statistically different from zero, suggesting that compared to SOEs 
(the base group), foreign firms discharge less sulfur dioxide, waste water, or soot per unit 
of sales. Second, in similar magnitude, domestic public-listed firms also have lower 
pollution intensity than SOEs, suggesting that they take more social responsibility due to 
the scrutiny of public investors. Third, firms that export more, are larger in size, or have 
more educated employees are less likely to generate pollutant discharge. Local protection 
appears to have a statistically significant effect on pollutant discharges (except for sulfur 
dioxide), although competition and property right protection do not seem to be correlated 
with pollutant discharges. 
The effects of foreign ownership are not only statistically, but also economically 
significant. We calculate the marginal effect of foreign ownership on pollution discharge 
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intensity using the formula 100[exp(b-var(b)/2)-1], where b represents the estimated 
coefficient and var(b) represents the variance of b.
29
 The coefficients on foreign 
ownership suggest that compared to SOEs, foreign firms will discharge less sulfur 
dioxide by 38%, less waste water by 63%, and less soot by 35%. Evaluated at the sample 
means, these reductions translate into 19.68 tons of sulfur dioxide per RMB100 million in 
sales, 209 tons of water per RMB10,000 in sales, or 12.69 tons of soot per RMB100 
million in sales. 
5.3 Determinants of above-quota pollutant discharge 
Thus far our analysis has focused on the overall level of pollutant discharge, but 
what probably threatens the environment more is the part of discharge that goes beyond 
the quota set by the national emission standards.
30
 As the pollution survey data also 
contain firm-reported above-quota discharge levels,
31
 we use the same specification as 
before to examine to what extent those factors affect above-quota pollution levels. In 
particular, we set emissions for firms at or below the quota at zero. We use the inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation of the above-quota emissions as the dependent variable to 
avoid the log(0) problem.
32
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 Please see Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and Kennedy (1981) for a discussion about the 
interpretation of the coefficients of dummy variables when the dependent variable is log-transformed.  
30
 See integrated emission standard of air pollutants (GB16297-1996) and integrated wastewater 
discharge standard (GB8978-1996) in People’s Republic of China. 
31
 In our sample, 8.45% of firms had sulfur dioxide over-discharge, 19.32% of firms had wastewater 
over-discharge, and 10.63% of firms had industrial soot over-discharge. 
32
  The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is expressed as the logarithm of (above-quota 
emission + sqrt (above-quota emission^2+1). For more details about the transformation, please see Zhang 
et al. (2000). 
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The OLS estimates for the three pollutants are shown in columns (1)-(3) of Table 
5. In general, the effects on above-quota pollution are similar to those on overall pollution 
levels, although the sign for soot over-discharge is negative but not statistically 
significant. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the estimates from a Tobit model and again, the 
estimated effects are consistent with the effects on overall pollution. The marginal effects 
actually show a larger magnitude on foreign ownership influence with the Tobit model. It 
is worth noting that although we did not find that property right protection has a 
consistent significant effect on total pollution levels, regarding pollutant over-discharge 
we find that a better institution characterized by a good court of law has a significant 
effect on pollution reduction when the pollution emissions exceed the standard level. This 
is not surprising because the law comes into effect when firms violate the environmental 
protection rules. Hence, better law enforcement effectively reduces pollution over-
discharges for all three of the pollutant types in our sample. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5.4 Heterogeneous effects by industry and area 
Given that the pollution emissions are unevenly concentrated in certain industries 
or areas, it is also interesting to investigate whether the effects of various determinants of 
pollution are different across industries or regions. 
First, we run the OLS estimation for two separate samples: one including firms 
from the four most heavy-polluted industries (about 60% of the full sample) and the other 
including all of the remaining firms. Table 6 reports the regression results (columns (1)-
(3) for heavy-polluted industries and columns (4)-(6) for non-heavy-polluted industries). 
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The results suggest several different aspects regarding the pollutant determinants across 
industries. First, we find that foreign firms have fewer pollution emissions compared to 
SOEs in the heavy-polluted industries. In contrast, the foreign ownership effect is not 
obvious in the non-heavy-polluted industries, except for the waste water discharge. We 
conduct a Chow test and the differences in the coefficients of the two samples are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Second, we find that larger firms and firms with 
more educated employees pollute less in both samples. Lastly, it is interesting to note that 
the estimated coefficients for export are all statistically significant at the 1% level for the 
non-heavy-polluted industry sample. They are negative but almost not statistically 
significant in the heavy-polluted industry sample. This suggests that exporting firms 
pollute less and the effect is more pronounced in non-heavy-polluted industries. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Next, to check whether the main effects also vary by area, we separate the sample 
by firm location. In particular, we define a firm as “coastal” if it is located in one of the 
eleven coastal provinces,
33
 and “non-coastal” otherwise. The respective OLS estimates 
for the coastal (columns (1)-(3)) and non-coastal (columns (4)-(6)) samples are reported 
in Table 7. The regression results show a larger magnitude of air pollution reduction and 
a smaller magnitude of waste water reduction for foreign firms in coastal areas than for 
those in non-coastal areas. This indicates that the foreign ownership effect is more 
pronounced on air pollution control but less so on waste water pollution reduction in 
coastal areas compared to non-coastal areas. The Chow test shows that the differences in 
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 The eleven coastal provinces include Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Tianjin, and Shanghai. 
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the coefficients of the two samples are statistically significant at the 5% level. We also 
find that larger firms and firms with more educated employees pollute less in both 
samples.  
Interestingly, we find that the coefficients of GDP per capita are positive and the 
coefficients of GDP per capita square are negative and significant in models for non-
coastal areas, indicating a consistent result of an inversed-U shape Kuznets curve and the 
pollutant discharge increases with GDP per capita at a decreasing rate. The results also 
indicate that the turning point of the inversed-U curve comes at a level of GDP per capita 
of about US$3,300 in non-coastal areas, which is much lower than that estimated by 
Grossman and Krueger (1995).
34
 In the coastal areas, however, there is no evidence for 
the Kuznets curve. We find that the pollutant discharge decreases with GDP per capita at 
a decreasing rate, which at least suggests that the higher incomes in China’s coastal areas 
have been associated with lower pollution levels. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
5.5 Other determinants of pollution intensity: Firm size 
In China, the Law of Water Pollution Prevention is a legal framework for water 
protection and water pollution prevention, but local governments still have the flexibility 
to formulate local laws, rules, regulations, and standards based on local situations. This 
also applies in relation to air pollution prevention. In our baseline regression, we find that 
small firms discharge more pollutants on average than large firms. Small firms pollution 
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 At a national conference held by SEPA in April 2006, China’s officials predicted that this turning 
point is US$3,000 for GDP per capita. 
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problems are more likely to be ignored by government officials than those of large-sized 
firms, and thus it is more common for local governments to indulge small firms, 
especially those who want to alleviate local employment pressure. Thus, we expect the 
effect of local protection on environmental pollution to be more serious within small-
sized firms. To test this conjecture, we include an interaction term (local_protection x 
small) to capture this additional effect. The results in Table 8 show that the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term is not only positive, but also statistically significant. 
These results suggest that local protectionism toward small firms increase the sulfur 
dioxide discharge intensity by 12%, waste water discharge intensity by 29%, and soot 
discharge intensity by 26%, compared to large firms. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
6. Specification Tests and Discussions 
So far we have shown that several factors are correlated with firm-level pollution 
intensity. However, we have to admit that these correlations may not necessarily imply 
causality because of the following reasons. First, there is a reverse causality possibility 
that pollution itself may deter foreign investment. Second, some unobserved firm 
characteristics (such as managerial ability) may both affect a firm’s emission trajectory 
and its attractiveness to foreign investment, leading to omitted variable biases. Similarly, 
export ratio and firm profitability may also be endogenously determined if they are both 
correlated with unobserved determinants of productivity. Things like these will weaken 
identification in the specifications in this study. Despite these limitations, our main 
results from the OLS regressions are generally consistent with some theoretical 
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predictions and previous empirical studies. Yet to increase the confidence in our 
estimates, in this section, we perform some additional specification tests and discuss their 
implications. 
6.1 Additional pollutants 
We first examine three additional pollutants, namely oxynitride, chemical oxygen 
demand (COD), and ammonia nitrogen. Although they are also important indicators of air 
or water pollution, we do not use them in our main regressions due to lots of missing 
values in them. Table 9 presents the results from OLS regressions using these three 
pollutants as dependent variables. The estimates generally exhibit a pattern that is similar 
to that of our main findings, though the sample size substantially decreases. This suggests 
that the effects of various pollution determinants are not sensitive to the type of pollutants 
examined.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
6.2 Unbalanced data 
Though some firms do happen to appear in both of the 2006 and 2007 surveys, 
our pollution dataset basically pools two cross-sectional samples and is by design not a 
balanced panel dataset. Moreover, because not all of the firms discharge sulfur dioxide, 
waste water, and soot at the same time, the sample sizes are different for the regressions 
with different pollutants as dependent variables. Overall, the original pollution data 
contains 5,904 firm year observations with discharge of sulfur dioxide, 4,753 
observations with discharge of waste water, and 5,253 observations with discharge of 
soot. Among them, 1,726 firms (3,524 observations) with discharge of sulfur dioxide, 
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1,473 firms (2,946 observations) with discharge of waste water, and 1,589 firms (3,178 
observations) with discharge of soot were surveyed in both years. After merging the 
pollution data with other data, in our final sample, the numbers of firm-year observations 
with discharge of sulfur dioxide, waste water, and soot drop to 1,576, 1,981, and 1,136, 
and the corresponding number of firms that appear in both years reduce to 683, 551, and 
566. To check whether the unbalance of our data is a serious problem, we drop firms that 
were only surveyed in either 2006 or 2007. As shown in columns 1-3 in Table 10, the 
results from the balanced data are similar to our main findings, suggesting that the data 
unbalance is not a big issue. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
6.3 HHI index 
Our main estimation does not find significant association between competition 
(measured by the HHI index) and firm-level pollution intensity. One possible explanation 
is that the cross-year variation in the HHI index is not sufficiently large to produce 
precise estimates, given that our model already controls for industry fixed effects (which 
captures any industry-specific factors that remain constant over time). Based on our own 
calculation, the value of HHI index increases by an average of 0.0012 between 2006 and 
2007, while the average value in 2006 is 0.0076. Besides, when we estimate the 
regressions without industry fixed effects (column 4-6 in Table 10), the coefficient on the 
HHI index turns statistically significant and its negative sign implies that less competition 
(higher HHI) is associated with less pollution. However, the disappearance of such 
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relationship once we include industry fixed effects is suggestive of a high correlation 
between the HHI index and time-invariant industrial characteristics. 
 6.4 Property rights protection and local protectionism 
Before the 1978 economic reform and open-door policy, the centralized fiscal 
system and planned economy were deeply rooted in China. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
the local authorities were granted the power to develop the local economy and ever since 
local protectionism has surged due to the incentive on local economic growth. Therefore, 
local protectionism has been a long-standing issue in China. The property right system is 
manifested by China’s local protectionism feature. An examination of the local protection 
or property rights indices over a period of years shows that they have very small 
variations within a province or city across time, suggesting that these two variables tend 
to be pre-determined. Furthermore, because the objective of local protection is the 
product market, as well as factors that relate to the power division between the central 
and the local government, social security system and the property right system, rather 
than pollution itself (Li et al., 2003), the original variation of local protectionism, if it has 
any, should not be correlated with the pattern of pollution intensity in China. In addition, 
our dependent variable is firm-level pollution, which makes it hard to argue that one 
individual firm’s pollutant emission will influence a whole province’s protection policies 
or legal system.  
Nonetheless, one may worry whether our measures of property rights protection 
and local protectionism are the most appropriate choices. Because the property rights 
protection is measured at the city level, and local protectionism is measured at the 
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province level, these measures may fail to capture the within-city or within-province 
variation. Although this is possible, there is limited information on the degree of variation 
below the current levels, and these are the best measures we can use given the available 
data. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we still try two alternative measures. In 
particular, we use the development of legal intermediate institutions as proxy for the 
quality of the legal system, and use the degree of market-determined price in the product 
market as proxy for local protectionism. These indices have also been widely used by 
academic scholars as proxies for institutional environment during China’s marketization 
in the past few years. Both index variables are from the NERI index of Marketization of 
China’s Provinces 2006 Report, measured at the province level, and with a higher value 
represents a better quality legal system or more local protectionism. The estimates 
reported in Table 11 are consistent with our main results, suggesting that our findings are 
robust to alternative measures.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
However, it is still possible that property rights protection and local protectionism 
might be related to some city- or province-level policies (or government features) that 
can affect local industrial pollution. Although we attempt to mitigate such biases by 
including several city-level socioeconomic variables, we cannot complete guard against 
the above possibility. Therefore, one should be cautious when drawing any causal 
inferences based on our estimates. 
6.5 Other empirical issues 
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During the data merging, our sample size drops dramatically from over 7,000 to 
2,842 mainly due to missing information on (city-level) property rights index and firm 
characteristics (e.g. ROA and leverage). However, it is quite reassuring that the statistics 
of many variables such as firm size, firm performance and ownership are very similar 
between firms included in our sample and those dropped during the sample construction 
(see Appendix Table 2). This suggests that the dropped observations are not 
systematically different from the sample we use. In addition, we also experiment with a 
large sample by replacing the missing values of property rights index with the province 
average, and replacing the missing firm characteristics with the industry average. Our 
results do not change significantly.
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As the self-reported data on pollution emissions are used as the basis for pollution 
fee charges, firms would have incentives to manipulate or under-report their discharges, 
thus leading to measurement error in our dependent variables. Although this is a 
legitimate concern (as in many other studies relying on self-reported information) that we 
cannot completely rule out, the costs of misreporting could be very high because firms 
participating in these surveys are under the direct supervision (and strict inspection) of 
the MEP. 
Finally, unlike other pollutant discharges that are directly reported, the measure of 
sulfur dioxide discharge is based on an indirect method with the consumption of energy 
resources multiplied by the associated sulfur dioxide emission coefficients.36 Regardless, 
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  These results are available from authors upon request. 
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  For example, for the thermal power plant, the sulfur dioxide emission = the amount of coal burned 
x sulfur content (in percentage) x 0.8 x 2 x (1- desulfurization degree). see The Working Plan for Major 
Pollutant Emission Statistics Method by the MEP, Issue 15, December 7, 2007. 
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the results for different pollutants are qualitatively similar, suggesting that the pollution 
dataset is mostly reliable. 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we use a unique firm-level dataset covering over 100 cities in China 
to study factors that are associated with Chinese industrial pollution intensity. We find 
that foreign firms have lower pollutant discharge intensity than SOEs. This effect is more 
pronounced for sulfur dioxide and soot pollution in heavy polluted industries, and more 
pronounced for waste water in coastal cities. These results suggest that a policy that 
targets foreign firms more harshly in China’s effort to reduce industrial pollution, as 
implied by some government reports, would be misguided. Our findings that public-listed 
firms also pollute less than SOEs suggest that under the scrutiny of public investors, 
public-invested firms take more SCR on pollution control. We also find that local 
protectionism is a major cause of pollution, and better property rights protection is 
negatively related to pollution especially when a firm discharges pollutants over and 
above the national standard. Therefore, better institutional control in the form of lower 
entry barriers across regional markets and more effective law enforcement are promising 
ways of curbing China’s pressing environmental problems during its current stage of 
economic development. In addition, we also document that firms of a larger size with 
more educated employees tend to pollute less. 
Even though our data alone do not support casual explanation, our findings are 
consistent with the theoretical predictions and previous empirical findings such as foreign 
firms pollute less (Wang and Jin, 2002; Liang, 2008) than SOEs, firms of a larger size 
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tend to pollute less (Holladay, 2010), and firms that export more pollute less (Milner and 
Xu, 2009; Holladay, 2010). This suggests that these associations may be consistent with 
causal explanations based on prior literatures. 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is one of the first to use nationwide firm-
level pollutant discharge amounts (as opposed to pollution fees) to measure pollution 
intensity in China. China’s economy is on a historic rise, but the resulting environmental 
damage could wipe out all of its success if China’s leaders do not take effective 
initiatives now. We hope that our study has provided some insights to China’s 
government by depicting a relatively complete picture of China’s manufacturing 
pollution situation and providing useful policy implications. 
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Figure 1. The Distribution of Pollutants Discharge by Industry 
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Table 1. Distribution of Pollutant Discharges by Province  
Province/Municipality Average SO2 
Average 
Wastewater 
Average Soot 
Unit 
SO2 (ton)/sales 
(100 million RMB) 
wastewater (ton)/sales 
(10,000 RMB) 
soot (ton)/sales 
(100 million RMB) 
Beijing* 26.49 0.00 3.20 
Tianjin* 27.90 0.06 10.79 
Hebei 30.87 2.76 16.15 
Shanxi 25.15 0.23 22.12 
Neimenggu 48.53 0.04 24.14 
Liaoning 47.25 0.08 25.64 
Jilin 56.63 0.85 17.15 
Heilongjiang 16.59 0.19 21.62 
Shanghai* 20.44 0.05 1.89 
Jiangsu 20.71 1.37 7.79 
Zhejiang 20.42 1.23 4.33 
Anhui 39.76 1.41 31.23 
Fujian 51.75 1.84 16.59 
Jiangxi 59.06 4.66 19.26 
Shandong 41.74 0.13 25.00 
Henan 79.51 6.97 39.93 
Hubei 37.09 5.22 20.11 
Hunan 51.11 1.85 105.77 
Guangdong 16.82 2.75 4.95 
Guangxi 68.36 1.99 23.21 
Chongqing* 120.39 2.68 15.55 
Sichuan 70.69 3.72 28.56 
Guizhou 120.59 2.10 12.28 
Yunnan 16.82 0.27 21.70 
Shaanxi 57.97 8.49 29.91 
Gansu 32.27 0.14 64.89 
Qinghai 53.45 0.10 0.75 
Ningxia 46.25 14.76 64.46 
Xinjiang 83.45 0.83 114.36 
    
Number of Firms 2,297 1,931 1,967 
* indicates China’s municipality directly governed by the central government. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pollutants      
SO2 2297 51.79  132.28  0 1610.35  
SO2_over 2297 6.88  65.77  0 1610.35  
wastewater 1931 3.32  17.72  0 320.72  
wastewater_over 1931 1.72  11.01  0 247.58  
soot 1967 36.26  171.27  0 3893.66  
soot_over 1967 10.64  79.71  0 1239.09  
oxynitride 1576 25.62  38.30  0  289.84  
COD 1981 35.37  126.26  0  1781.07  
ammonia nitrogen 1136 2.60  11.58  0  257.37  
Ownership      
SOE 2842 0.14  0.34  0 1 
foreign 2842 0.19  0.39  0 1 
private 2842 0.25  0.43  0 1 
public 2842 0.11  0.31  0 1 
collectives 2842 0.05  0.23  0 1 
limited 2842 0.26  0.44  0 1 
Firm-level Variables       
export 2842 0.08 0.20 0 1 
firm_size 2842 6.41  1.24  0 11.64  
firm_age 2842 2.69  0.72  1.61  4.97  
ROA 2842 0.01  0.02  -0.16  0.28  
leverage 2842 0.59  1.81  0 27.17  
R&D 2842 0.00  0.01  0 0.15  
education 2842 0.16  0.16  0 1 
Other Variables      
competition 2842 0.03  0.06  0.00  0.58  
local_protection 2842 2.52  1.38  0.76  9.51  
property_right 2842 0.65  0.17  0.27  0.98  
pop_intensity 2842 0.05  0.03  0.01  0.24  
unemployment 2842 0.03  0.01  0.01  0.09  
gdp_per_capita 2842 2.97  1.90  0.47  9.19  
gdp_per_capita2 2842 12.42  16.26  0.22  84.48  
Note: All of the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1.  
 
 
 46 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrices 
Panel A. Correlations between Pollutant Discharges and Firm-level Variables 
  SO2 wastewater soot foreign private public collectives limited export firm_size firm_age ROA leverage R&D 
wastewater 0.1076*              
soot 0.2146* 0.1430*             
foreign -0.0417 -0.0604* -0.0638*           
private -0.064 0.0667* 0.0249 -0.2685*           
public -0.0504 -0.0489 -0.0202 -0.1700* -0.1969*         
collectives -0.0068 0.0728* 0.0051 -0.1144* -0.1325* -0.0839         
limited 0.0111 0.0376 0.0468* -0.2877* -0.3332* -0.2110* -0.1419*       
export -0.1128 -0.0490* -0.0657* 0.2246* -0.0685* 0.0067 -0.0445* -0.0737       
firm_size -0.0873 -0.1562* -0.0776* -0.0224 -0.2750* 0.1743* -0.1169* -0.0277 0.1173*      
firm_age 0.0224 -0.0377 -0.0193 -0.1545* -0.2230* 0.0903* 0.0620* -0.0632* 0.0095 0.3474*     
ROA 0.0055 0.0251 0.0127 -0.0216 0.0285 -0.0127 0.0173 0.0079 -0.0216 0.0084 -0.0173    
leverage 0.0223 0.0136 -0.0002 -0.0345 0.0158 -0.0161 0.0074 0.0183 -0.0405* -0.0255 -0.0274 -0.0612   
R&D -0.0475 -0.0438 -0.0058 -0.0103 -0.0452* 0.1093* -0.0371* -0.0313 0.1331* 0.1703* 0.1023* 0.0167 -0.025  
education 0.1428* -0.0981* -0.0156 0.1670* -0.2669* 0.0662* -0.1531* -0.0122 -0.012 0.1529* 0.0451* -0.007 0.0941* 0.1255* 
Panel B. Correlations between Pollutant Discharges and Other Variables 
  SO2 wastewater soot 
compe 
-tition 
local_protec
tion 
property_right pop_intensity unemployment gdp_per_capita 
wastewater 0.1076*         
soot 0.2146* 0.1430*        
competition -0.0987* 0.0662* -0.0600*       
local_protection 0.1055* 0.0957* 0.0869* 0.0085      
property_right -0.0225 -0.0321 -0.0683* -0.0107 -0.4241*     
pop_intensity -0.0277 -0.0435* -0.0112 0.0194 -0.3451* 0.0507*    
unemployment 0.0276 0.0591* 0.0317 -0.0119 0.2267* -0.2599* -0.1959*   
gdp_per_capita -0.0992* -0.0924* -0.0708* 0.0175 -0.4364* 0.1981* 0.4525* -0.3298*  
gdp_per_capita2 -0.0877* -0.0665* -0.0607* 0.0170 -0.3826* 0.1700* 0.4171* -0.3009* 0.9606* 
* indicates 5% significance level. 
 47 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Pollutants Discharge: OLS Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES SO2 water soot SO2 water soot 
foreign -0.4952*** -1.0310*** -0.4731** -0.4481*** -0.9203*** -0.3737* 
 
(0.1574) (0.2667) (0.2110) (0.1550) (0.2585) (0.2070) 
private -0.1581 -0.4232 0.1535 -0.1307 -0.3443 0.2166 
 
(0.1893) (0.3062) (0.2391) (0.1865) (0.3020) (0.2357) 
public -0.5008*** -0.7950*** -0.3217 -0.4814*** -0.7417*** -0.2611 
 
(0.1769) (0.2450) (0.2017) (0.1798) (0.2413) (0.2064) 
collectives 0.0410 -0.6510** 0.1375 0.0622 -0.5866* 0.1777 
 
(0.2055) (0.3275) (0.3215) (0.2035) (0.3188) (0.3121) 
limited -0.3505** -0.6572** -0.2168 -0.3185** -0.5740** -0.1440 
 
(0.1445) (0.2670) (0.1951) (0.1419) (0.2602) (0.1926) 
export -0.7513*** -0.8534** -1.1128*** -0.7600*** -0.8470** -1.1174*** 
 
(0.2582) (0.3300) (0.2881) (0.2602) (0.3247) (0.2893) 
firm_size -0.1059** -0.9381*** -0.1520*** -0.1109*** -0.9480*** -0.1639*** 
 
(0.0418) (0.0856) (0.0484) (0.0414) (0.0860) (0.0483) 
firm_age 0.0542 0.1801* -0.1195 0.0674 0.2074** -0.0914 
 
(0.0715) (0.0940) (0.0914) (0.0710) (0.0925) (0.0892) 
ROA 2.2196 -10.3034** -0.5286 2.3136 -10.2500** -0.0267 
 
(3.4132) (4.6707) (3.2610) (3.3916) (4.6894) (3.2567) 
leverage 0.0163 0.0515** 0.0171 0.0156 0.0516** 0.0185 
 
(0.0155) (0.0246) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0247) (0.0154) 
R&D -8.8802 -1.8945 -10.7060** -8.9838 -1.2521 -10.0911* 
 
(7.8632) (6.6989) (5.3157) (7.7240) (6.5579) (5.1114) 
education -0.9712** -3.7288*** -1.5565*** -0.9922** -3.8268*** -1.6260*** 
 
(0.3886) (0.5778) (0.3661) (0.3855) (0.5834) (0.3652) 
competition -0.1453 -1.7989* -1.0408 -0.0395 -1.6363 -0.8357 
 (0.9979) (1.0644) (1.2423) (1.0087) (1.0443) (1.2814) 
local_protection    0.0701 0.1271** 0.1123** 
    (0.0455) (0.0520) (0.0546) 
property_right    0.0457 -0.2453 -0.4515 
    (0.3543) (0.4247) (0.4179) 
pop_intensity -2.7949 -6.0860*** -7.0009*** -2.8750 -6.8670*** -7.6003*** 
 
(1.9843) (2.2349) (2.0585) (2.0476) (2.2171) (2.2658) 
unemployment -2.4824 -2.8643 -2.9797 -3.0982 -5.5566 -5.3664 
 
(3.4280) (5.2585) (4.2244) (3.7137) (5.3151) (4.4212) 
gdp_per_capita -0.1100 -0.6681*** -0.4296*** -0.0724 -0.5971*** -0.3512** 
 
(0.1067) (0.1146) (0.1371) (0.1120) (0.1196) (0.1392) 
gdp_per_capita2 -0.0008 0.0589*** 0.0318** -0.0034 0.0546*** 0.0267* 
 
(0.0123) (0.0112) (0.0148) (0.0125) (0.0113) (0.0157) 
       Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2297 1931 1967 2297 1931 1967 
R-squared 0.4060 0.6052 0.3899 0.4077 0.6079 0.3959 
Columns (1)-(3) show the OLS regressions with the logarithm of the amount of SO2, waste water and soot 
discharge as the dependent variable, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) add two more variables (local_protection and 
property_right) into the regressions by using the same respective dependent variable as in (1)-(3). Robust 
standard errors clustered with cities are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Pollutants Discharge Over Standard Level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES log(SO2_over) 
log(polluted 
water_over) log(soot_over) log(SO2_over) 
log(polluted 
water_over) log(soot_over) 
MODEL OLS OLS OLS TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT 
foreign -0.2329* -0.1809** -0.1574* -0.2657** -0.191*** -0.1792 
 
(0.1359) (0.0800) (0.0907) [0.1240] [0.0640] [0.1049] 
private -0.2007 -0.0399 -0.0137 -0.2994** -0.0862 -0.1256 
 
(0.1280) (0.0947) (0.1291) [0.1198] [0.0659] [0.1037] 
public -0.2185* -0.1657 -0.1077 -0.2300* -0.1142* -0.1399 
 
(0.1228) (0.1058) (0.1084) [0.1258] [0.0626] [0.1119] 
collectives -0.1349 -0.4547*** -0.0598 -0.2555 -0.3285*** -0.2334* 
 
(0.2001) (0.1266) (0.2521) [0.1457] [0.0709] [0.1264] 
limited -0.1981 -0.1531* -0.0707 -0.2284** -0.1716*** -0.1247 
 
(0.1256) (0.0819) (0.0932) [0.1119] [0.0586] [0.0943] 
export -0.1385 0.0330 -0.1715 -0.0616 0.133 -0.1316 
 
(0.1080) (0.0985) (0.1158) [0.2054] [0.0849] [0.1638] 
firm_size -0.0983*** -0.0544* -0.1248*** -0.1632*** -0.041** -0.1346*** 
 
(0.0319) (0.0276) (0.0387) [0.0376] [0.0177] [0.0298] 
firm_age 0.0195 -0.0276 -0.0552 0.0321 -0.0237 -0.0422 
 
(0.0454) (0.0352) (0.0716) [0.0518] [0.0272] [0.0435] 
ROA 1.0291 0.7637 1.0397 1.9823 1.0484 1.2309 
 
(1.5182) (1.5422) (1.9279) [2.0284] [0.9663] [1.6630] 
leverage -0.0143 -0.0376*** -0.0125 -0.0195 -0.0517*** -0.0182 
 
(0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0172) [0.0226] [0.0181] [0.0158] 
R&D -0.7955 1.7317 -0.7845 -0.7944 1.1319 -1.7359 
 
(2.1081) (3.0104) (2.7129) [5.5196] [2.3137] [4.7495] 
education -0.0616 -0.2045 -0.3282 -0.0749 -0.0593 -0.2752 
 
(0.1798) (0.2146) (0.2143) [0.2609] [0.1459] [0.2089] 
competition -0.0768 0.1468 0.5252 -0.1147 0.0931 0.4277 
 
(0.4971) (0.4263) (0.5357) [0.7529] [0.3341] [0.5812] 
local_protection 0.0020 0.0587 0.0637 -0.0259 0.0108 0.0377 
 
(0.0334) (0.0494) (0.0466) [0.0287] [0.0145] [0.0231] 
property_right -0.9124* -0.6685** -1.2912** -1.2049*** -0.6303*** -1.1867*** 
 
(0.4733) (0.3087) (0.6029) [0.2241] [0.1080] [0.1841] 
pop_intensity -0.7549 -1.4090 -2.0175 -0.6552 -0.2009 -1.5633 
 
(1.3602) (1.2170) (1.6943) [1.4040] [0.5925] [1.1122] 
unemployment -1.3089 1.0441 -3.2607 -0.9386 3.0644** -2.905 
 
(2.7061) (2.8182) (3.5341) [2.6127] [1.3597] [2.1556] 
gdp_per_capita -0.1225 -0.1139* -0.1342 -0.1159 -0.0473 -0.1435** 
 
(0.0743) (0.0667) (0.0928) [0.0815] [0.0350] [0.0621] 
gdp_per_capita2 0.0089 0.0116 0.0125 0.0002 0.0049 0.009 
 
(0.0073) (0.0070) (0.0095) [0.0104] [0.0038] [0.0076] 
       Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2297 1931 1967 2297 1931 1967 
R-squared 0.0634 0.1393 0.1645 0.0740 0.0832 0.1270 
Note: Columns (1)-(3) show the OLS estimates with the logarithm of the intensity of sulfur dioxide, wastewater and soot over-
discharge as the dependent variable, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) show the marginal effects for the Tobit model by repeating the 
same estimation as above. The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of above-quota emission is used as the dependent variable to 
avoid the log(0) problem. All of the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. Robust standard errors clustered with cities are in 
brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Determinants of Pollutants Discharge: Heavy vs. Non-Heavy Polluted Industries 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
DEPVAR Log(SO2) Log(water) Log(soot) 
 
Log(SO2) Log(water) Log(soot) 
HEAVY POLLUTED 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES   NO NO NO 
foreign -0.4872*** -0.7733** -0.4035* 
 
-0.3028 -1.1436*** -0.3115 
 
(0.1420) (0.3108) (0.2183) 
 
(0.3775) (0.3849) (0.3879) 
private -0.2964 0.0254 0.1193  
0.1533 -0.8552* 0.3351 
 
(0.1805) (0.3305) (0.2653) 
 
(0.3784) (0.4834) (0.3952) 
public -0.6396*** -0.6450** -0.3410  
-0.1966 -0.8470** -0.1496 
 
(0.1919) (0.2892) (0.2278) 
 
(0.3171) (0.3810) (0.3469) 
collectives 0.0051 -0.0354 0.3659  
0.0805 -1.9080*** -0.5275 
 
(0.1845) (0.3437) (0.3688) 
 
(0.4936) (0.5435) (0.5110) 
limited -0.3674** -0.3529 -0.2224  
-0.2784 -0.8960** -0.0145 
 
(0.1445) (0.2934) (0.2107) 
 
(0.2919) (0.4018) (0.3352) 
export -0.4942 -0.4576 -0.7920*  
-0.8491*** -1.0163*** -1.2942*** 
 
(0.4238) (0.4684) (0.4344) 
 
(0.3181) (0.3691) (0.3437) 
firm_size -0.0744 -0.8352*** -0.1023  
-0.1426* -1.0576*** -0.2431*** 
 
(0.0476) (0.0820) (0.0710) 
 
(0.0859) (0.1307) (0.0804) 
firm_age 0.1425* 0.1337 -0.0289  
-0.0588 0.2983* -0.1892 
 
(0.0746) (0.0989) (0.1019) 
 
(0.1372) (0.1705) (0.1435) 
ROA 6.3334 -7.9898 6.0315  
-1.6426 -12.6650** -4.9466 
 
(3.9564) (6.4912) (4.4389) 
 
(4.5990) (5.1221) (3.5776) 
leverage 0.0058 0.0437** 0.0237  
0.0697* 0.1021 0.0379 
 
(0.0148) (0.0213) (0.0164) 
 
(0.0410) (0.0798) (0.0489) 
R&D 7.0386 -19.2441 -0.8688  
-12.2501 2.6268 -10.9848 
 
(4.7022) (18.2892) (8.8000) 
 
(7.9550) (8.0106) (6.8670) 
education -0.4891 -4.2871*** -1.3818***  
-2.1910* -2.9930*** -2.2663** 
 
(0.3013) (0.6320) (0.3180) 
 
(1.1457) (1.1106) (0.9799) 
competition 0.5744 -1.4074 0.2292  
-1.5341 1.7307 -3.2951 
 
(0.8752) (0.9788) (0.9139) 
 
(2.0686) (1.8684) (2.3572) 
local_protection 0.0588 0.1601*** 0.0959  
0.0810 0.0001 0.0944 
 
(0.0500) (0.0600) (0.0646) 
 
(0.0868) (0.0780) (0.0910) 
property_right -0.0224 -0.2812 -0.5003  
0.0756 0.0542 -0.5111 
 
(0.3681) (0.4400) (0.5151) 
 
(0.6427) (0.7474) (0.7520) 
pop_intensity -0.4295 -8.6012** -5.2121**  
-6.4701** -4.2771 -11.4061*** 
 
(2.0675) (3.4081) (2.5937) 
 
(3.2596) (3.2685) (3.4132) 
unemployment 3.1807 6.8870 0.7751  
-12.1795* -20.0631*** -11.4130** 
 
(4.0128) (6.1363) (5.1994) 
 
(6.4177) (6.9122) (5.6453) 
gdp_per_capita -0.1226 -0.6485*** -0.4870***  
0.0112 -0.3419* -0.1091 
 
(0.0948) (0.1408) (0.1379) 
 
(0.2140) (0.1941) (0.2229) 
gdp_per_capita2 0.0035 0.0601*** 0.0426***  
-0.0144 0.0285* -0.0001 
 
(0.0093) (0.0138) (0.0137) 
 
(0.0236) (0.0167) (0.0243) 
        Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1511 1141 1230 
 
786 790 737 
R-squared 0.3309 0.5509 0.3021 
 
0.2552 0.6662 0.3268 
Columns (1)-(3) show the OLS regression for heavy polluted industries, with the logarithm of the amount of SO2, waste water and 
soot discharge as the dependent variable, respectively; Columns (4)-(6) show the OLS regression for non-heavy polluted industries. 
Heavy industries include i) pulp and paper manufacturing, ii) chemicals and chemical material manufacturing, iii) non-metal (e.g. 
cement) manufacturing, and (iv) electricity and thermal industry, in our sample. Robust standard errors clustered with cities are in 
brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Determinants of Pollutants Discharge: Coastal vs. Non-coastal Areas 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
DEPVAR Log(SO2) Log(water) Log(soot)   Log(SO2) Log(water) Log(soot) 
    Coastal Area       Non-coastal Area   
foreign -0.5273*** -0.8056*** -0.5180***  
-0.4029* -1.0910*** -0.3634 
  (0.1708) (0.2712) (0.1943)  
(0.2180) (0.3098) (0.2697) 
private -0.2712 -0.3287 -0.1202  
0.0079 -0.5023 0.4989* 
  (0.1862) (0.2928) (0.2192)  
(0.2136) (0.3063) (0.2776) 
public -0.5987*** -0.4557* -0.5837***  
-0.4398** -1.1378*** -0.1550 
  (0.1993) (0.2658) (0.2075)  
(0.2137) (0.2774) (0.2744) 
collectives -0.3439 -0.6646* -0.3883  
0.1710 -0.6861* 0.6158* 
  (0.2236) (0.3503) (0.2585)  
(0.2501) (0.4067) (0.3455) 
limited -0.3947** -0.4435* -0.4320**  
-0.2091 -0.7319*** 0.0844 
  (0.1568) (0.2432) (0.1803)  
(0.1926) (0.2814) (0.2456) 
export -0.8541*** -1.2527*** -1.0491***  
-0.5758* -0.1835 -1.3314*** 
  (0.2717) (0.2599) (0.2700)  
(0.3408) (0.5455) (0.4150) 
firm_size -0.0825** -0.8770*** -0.1070**  
-0.1727*** -1.0904*** -0.2386*** 
  (0.0402) (0.0819) (0.0457)  
(0.0596) (0.0895) (0.0770) 
firm_age 0.0619 0.2536*** -0.0068  
0.0781 0.0669 -0.2024* 
  (0.0654) (0.0975) (0.0780)  
(0.0799) (0.1195) (0.1127) 
ROA -1.9805 -17.5749*** -2.5207  
5.8038 -4.6740 -2.2473 
  (3.6615) (5.1348) (2.9090)  
(4.1031) (5.0510) (5.6638) 
leverage 0.0263 0.0789*** 0.0535***  
-0.0010 0.0205 -0.0238 
  (0.0179) (0.0287) (0.0194)  
(0.0160) (0.0342) (0.0192) 
R&D 11.2745 -9.1317 12.9444  
-12.8284** 9.8021 -17.2185*** 
  (9.5913) (12.2553) (12.0499)  
(6.1267) (6.2031) (4.9506) 
education -1.1636** -3.4647*** -2.0578***  
-0.9492** -4.7769*** -1.4733*** 
  (0.4711) (0.6109) (0.4187)  
(0.3714) (0.6301) (0.4236) 
competition 0.6278 -2.1068* 0.8416  
-0.6261 -1.0499 -1.8275 
  (0.9786) (1.1577) (1.0454)  
(1.4694) (1.3067) (1.4811) 
local_protection 0.0051 -0.0505 0.1284*  
-0.0085 0.0990 0.0481 
  (0.0673) (0.0803) (0.0762)  
(0.0481) (0.0737) (0.0676) 
property_right 0.0261 -0.2910 0.0056  
-0.2692 -0.5062 -0.1654 
  (0.2845) (0.4420) (0.3063)  
(0.3786) (0.5138) (0.4723) 
pop_intensity -3.9560** -8.5847*** -2.7475  
1.4144 -2.8267 -10.1048*** 
  (1.7215) (2.5940) (1.9756)  
(3.0526) (3.8755) (3.6024) 
unemployment 5.1589 3.2550 5.0385  
-11.2236*** -13.2023** -10.2529** 
  (3.5461) (5.9222) (4.2040)  
(3.6512) (5.8816) (4.6591) 
gdp_per_capita -0.2409*** -0.6213*** -0.6721***  
0.7183*** 0.0572 0.7513*** 
  (0.0869) (0.1368) (0.1053)  
(0.1840) (0.2579) (0.2586) 
gdp_per_capita2 0.0170* 0.0611*** 0.0568***  
-0.1327*** -0.0621 -0.1208*** 
  (0.0089) (0.0132) (0.0102)  
(0.0321) (0.0413) (0.0453) 
                
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1322 1172 1171 
 
975 759 796 
R-squared 0.4719 0.6223 0.4518 
 
0.3875 0.6275 0.3750 
Columns (1)-(3) show the OLS estimates for firms in coastal areas, with the logarithm of the intensity of SO2, waste water and soot 
discharge as the dependent variable, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) show the OLS estimates for firms in non-coastal areas. Coastal 
areas include 11 coastal provinces - Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Tianjin 
and Shanghai. Robust standard errors clustered with cities are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Determinants of Pollutants Discharge: Local Protection Towards Small-sized Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEP VAR Log(SO2) Log(SO2) Log(water) Log(water) Log(soot) Log(soot) 
foreign -0.4105*** -0.4188*** -0.6507** -0.6554** -0.3109 -0.3203 
 
(0.1536) (0.1524) (0.2691) (0.2677) (0.2072) (0.2060) 
private -0.0817 -0.1015 0.1869 0.1443 0.3065 0.2636 
 
(0.1804) (0.1791) (0.2869) (0.2831) (0.2399) (0.2360) 
public -0.4691** -0.4816*** -0.6840** -0.6967** -0.2344 -0.2578 
 
(0.1796) (0.1771) (0.2703) (0.2684) (0.2067) (0.2045) 
collectives 0.1032 0.0809 -0.1115 -0.1595 0.2484 0.1880 
 
(0.2072) (0.2075) (0.3024) (0.3016) (0.3204) (0.3193) 
limited -0.2812** -0.2983** -0.3299 -0.3556 -0.0824 -0.1125 
 
(0.1386) (0.1375) (0.2612) (0.2604) (0.1932) (0.1895) 
small 0.2574*** -0.0429 1.3834*** 0.7675*** 0.3219*** -0.2898 
 
(0.0901) (0.1726) (0.1497) (0.2814) (0.1141) (0.2125) 
local_protection 0.0663 0.0351 0.0994* 0.0508 0.1069* 0.0589 
 
(0.0451) (0.0501) (0.0535) (0.0522) (0.0554) (0.0601) 
local_protection x  small  0.1243*  0.2697***  0.2622*** 
  (0.0679)  (0.0948)  (0.0940) 
export -0.7652*** -0.7959*** -0.8725** -0.9123** -1.1178*** -1.1721*** 
 
(0.2616) (0.2613) (0.3866) (0.3892) (0.2942) (0.2933) 
firm_age 0.0469 0.0450 -0.0697 -0.0737 -0.1290 -0.1335 
 
(0.0711) (0.0707) (0.0983) (0.0985) (0.0880) (0.0878) 
ROA 2.0770 1.9450 -11.4125** -11.4917** -0.4005 -0.6088 
 
(3.4076) (3.3418) (4.8677) (4.8506) (3.2415) (3.1578) 
leverage 0.0150 0.0141 0.0522** 0.0553** 0.0180 0.0156 
 
(0.0157) (0.0159) (0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0153) (0.0154) 
R&D -9.2424 -8.9865 -6.1560 -5.6643 -10.6616** -10.0978** 
 
(7.4073) (7.3503) (8.9168) (9.0927) (5.0210) (4.9413) 
education -1.0310*** -1.0551*** -3.9995*** -4.0548*** -1.6739*** -1.7550*** 
 
(0.3867) (0.3887) (0.6047) (0.6066) (0.3670) (0.3744) 
competition -0.0516 -0.0527 -1.8780 -1.8851 -0.8599 -0.8525 
 
(0.9806) (0.9708) (1.2570) (1.2593) (1.2381) (1.2238) 
property_right 0.0309 0.0085 -0.3134 -0.3420 -0.4724 -0.5000 
 
(0.3524) (0.3462) (0.4551) (0.4584) (0.4199) (0.4083) 
pop_intensity -2.9695 -2.8820 -7.2673*** -7.2220*** -7.7071*** -7.6258*** 
 
(2.0661) (2.0420) (2.2799) (2.3124) (2.3341) (2.3396) 
unemployment -3.4182 -3.5325 -9.9660 -10.5351* -6.2082 -6.6621 
 
(3.6863) (3.6313) (6.2496) (6.1522) (4.3791) (4.3074) 
gdp_per_capita -0.0855 -0.0752 -0.7063*** -0.6758*** -0.3792*** -0.3473** 
 
(0.1116) (0.1104) (0.1321) (0.1365) (0.1378) (0.1357) 
gdp_per_capita2 -0.0020 -0.0031 0.0653*** 0.0624*** 0.0295* 0.0263* 
 
(0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0130) (0.0134) (0.0155) (0.0152) 
       Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2297 2297 1931 1931 1967 1967 
R-squared 0.4076 0.4089 0.5550 0.5570 0.3940 0.3980 
Columns (1), (3) and (5) show the OLS regressions with the logarithm of the amount of SO2, waste water and soot discharge as the 
dependent variable, respectively. These regressions include the firm size dummy variable small, which takes the value of one if firm size 
is within the 25 percentile of small-sized firms, or zero otherwise. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show the same regressions as in (1), (3), and 
(5), respectively, by including the interaction term between local_protection and small. Local_protection is a province-level 
measurement, and a higher value indicates a higher entry barrier, thus more local protection. Robust standard errors clustered with cities 
are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Alternative Measurements of Pollutants Discharge 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES log(oxynitride) log(COD) 
log(ammonia 
nitrogen) 
foreign -0.3538* -0.4563** -0.5212* 
 
(0.1903) (0.2099) (0.2694) 
private -0.2308 -0.1662 -0.0247 
 
(0.2243) (0.2451) (0.2561) 
public -0.5342*** -0.3073 -0.6747*** 
 
(0.2012) (0.2148) (0.2605) 
collectives -0.1544 -0.2152 0.5011 
 
(0.2688) (0.2444) (0.3837) 
limited -0.2454 -0.3007 -0.1001 
 
(0.1752) (0.2265) (0.2280) 
export -1.0665*** -0.2510 -0.3701 
 
(0.2636) (0.2465) (0.2983) 
firm_size -0.0689 -0.2594*** -0.1533** 
 
(0.0458) (0.0538) (0.0676) 
firm_age -0.0435 0.0490 0.0696 
 
(0.0666) (0.0713) (0.1017) 
ROA 1.6998 -3.0005 -7.3359* 
 
(3.7533) (3.5140) (4.0810) 
leverage 0.0325** 0.0156 0.0011 
 
(0.0145) (0.0260) (0.0463) 
R&D -4.9134 6.2172 -15.1801 
 
(10.6676) (5.0390) (10.9539) 
education -0.5657* -1.7051*** -1.1348* 
 
(0.3045) (0.4012) (0.5920) 
competition -0.9657 -1.7995** -1.1525 
 
(0.9374) (0.7814) (1.6388) 
local_protection -0.0154 0.0862** 0.0335 
 
(0.0496) (0.0426) (0.0599) 
property_right -0.8000** -0.6938* -0.4446 
 
(0.3520) (0.3527) (0.4584) 
pop_intensity -3.3623 -5.8791*** -9.7808*** 
 
(2.4819) (1.8426) (2.0418) 
unemployment -0.4991 -3.7165 -3.4182 
 
(4.7280) (4.6929) (5.8366) 
gdp_per_capita -0.0563 -0.2148* -0.4041*** 
 
(0.1160) (0.1106) (0.1307) 
gdp_per_capita2 0.0032 0.0193* 0.0402*** 
 
(0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0140) 
    Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1576 1981 1136 
R-squared 0.5253 0.5071 0.3805 
Columns (1)-(3) show the OLS regressions with the logarithm of the amount of oxynitride, chemical 
oxygen demand (COD) and ammonia nitrogen scaled by sales as the dependent variable, respectively. 
Robust standard errors clustered with cities are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10. Determinants of Pollutants Discharge: Balanced Panel 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
DEPVAR Log(SO2) Log(water) Log(soot)   Log(SO2) Log(water) Log(soot) 
  Balanced Panel   
  
All Sample 
foreign -0.6050*** -0.9139** -0.5722**  
-0.6799*** -0.4742* -0.6917*** 
  (0.2008) (0.4225) (0.2297)  
(0.2163) (0.2726) (0.2400) 
private -0.3114 -0.4171 -0.0354  
-0.8224*** 0.1274 -0.4847* 
  (0.2303) (0.4752) (0.2701)  
(0.1994) (0.3228) (0.2601) 
public -0.7910*** -0.7110* -0.6301**  
-0.9287*** -0.5618* -0.7491*** 
  (0.2623) (0.4226) (0.2500)  
(0.2313) (0.3006) (0.2687) 
collectives -0.1797 -1.2172** -0.3079  
-0.5161** 0.2294 -0.4091 
  (0.2908) (0.5027) (0.3884)  
(0.2333) (0.4101) (0.3460) 
limited -0.3919** -0.7077 -0.3649  
-0.6236*** -0.1565 -0.4361* 
  (0.1887) (0.4428) (0.2205)  
(0.1895) (0.2590) (0.2234) 
export -1.0160*** -1.2597*** -1.6084***  
-2.0030*** 0.0313 -2.1685*** 
  (0.3472) (0.3912) (0.3823)  
(0.2609) (0.3142) (0.2788) 
firm_size -0.1250* -0.9114*** -0.1296*  
-0.4014*** -1.2588*** -0.4456*** 
  (0.0665) (0.1268) (0.0715)  
(0.0448) (0.0992) (0.0535) 
firm_age 0.0314 0.0671 -0.1528  
0.0709 0.3295*** -0.0654 
  (0.0831) (0.1471) (0.1192)  
(0.0861) (0.1183) (0.0931) 
ROA 4.9116 -5.7616 6.9252  
-6.2202* -6.6653 -7.0102* 
  (4.1993) (6.4001) (4.6451)  
(3.5710) (4.6777) (3.6059) 
leverage 0.0185 0.0508 0.0168  
0.0429** 0.0245 0.0460** 
  (0.0188) (0.0343) (0.0205)  
(0.0193) (0.0313) (0.0185) 
R&D -32.9467*** -15.8160 -28.6306**  
-21.6527** 2.3030 -19.6486** 
  (10.6960) (12.5327) (13.3656)  
(10.3144) (7.7871) (8.1785) 
education -0.7137* -3.6139*** -1.4779***  
0.3862 -5.7907*** -0.3057 
  (0.3644) (0.9378) (0.4767)  
(0.3890) (0.5626) (0.3387) 
competition 1.7062 -0.2541 0.9955  
-3.0692*** -6.1624*** -4.2217*** 
  (1.1051) (0.9857) (1.0292)  
(0.7282) (1.2326) (1.0629) 
local_protection 0.0315 0.1519* 0.1045  
0.0333 0.1532** 0.0550 
  (0.0625) (0.0830) (0.0690)  
(0.0449) (0.0604) (0.0540) 
property_right -0.0046 -0.2182 -0.2244  
0.1746 0.2490 -0.3685 
  (0.4365) (0.5278) (0.5226)  
(0.4175) (0.5754) (0.4971) 
pop_intensity -0.5720 -10.2958*** -4.8206  
-1.3806 -5.7242* -7.4398*** 
  (2.9346) (3.5044) (3.2555)  
(2.0697) (2.9862) (2.2205) 
unemployment -0.8624 -2.5413 -2.1655  
-3.8078 -5.4595 -4.2184 
  (4.9716) (7.5447) (5.3063)  
(3.8468) (6.3402) (4.9038) 
gdp_per_capita -0.0904 -0.5427*** -0.4473***  
0.0380 -0.5902*** -0.2841** 
  (0.1202) (0.1680) (0.1437)  
(0.1249) (0.1536) (0.1384) 
gdp_per_capita2 -0.0013 0.0558*** 0.0372**  
-0.0132 0.0515*** 0.0221 
  (0.0125) (0.0148) (0.0150)  
(0.0141) (0.0137) (0.0156) 
                
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes   No No No 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1364 1102 1132  2297 1931 1967 
R-squared 0.4405 0.6379 0.4423  0.1649 0.4462 0.2189 
Columns (1)-(6) show the OLS regressions with the logarithm of the amount of SO2, waste water and soot discharge as the 
dependent variable, respectively. For each regression in column (1)-(3), we require that firms have observations for two years (2006 
and 2007) on the respective pollutant emission information. For each regression in column (4)-(6), we do not include industry fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors clustered with cities are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11. Alternative Measures of Local Protectionism and Property Rights Protection 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEPVAR Log(SO2) Log(water) Log(soot) Log(SO2) Log(water) Log(soot) 
foreign -0.4063*** -0.8882*** -0.3579* -0.4692*** -0.9984*** -0.4143** 
 
(0.1536) (0.2564) (0.2063) (0.1577) (0.2622) (0.2080) 
private -0.1020 -0.3176 0.2295 -0.1456 -0.4075 0.1892 
 
(0.1871) (0.2965) (0.2350) (0.1900) (0.3056) (0.2363) 
public -0.4431** -0.7221*** -0.2669 -0.4830*** -0.7581*** -0.2700 
 
(0.1717) (0.2376) (0.2022) (0.1788) (0.2430) (0.2049) 
collectives 0.0531 -0.5940* 0.1780 -0.0028 -0.6498** 0.0923 
 
(0.2042) (0.3162) (0.3195) (0.2054) (0.3219) (0.3083) 
limited -0.2738* -0.5426** -0.1311 -0.3356** -0.6331** -0.1737 
 
(0.1410) (0.2576) (0.1924) (0.1472) (0.2650) (0.1944) 
export -0.7285*** -0.8105** -1.0889*** -0.7308*** -0.8429** -1.0948*** 
 
(0.2583) (0.3267) (0.2851) (0.2582) (0.3306) (0.2834) 
firm_size -0.1004** -0.9435*** -0.1591*** -0.1077** -0.9411*** -0.1575*** 
 
(0.0414) (0.0855) (0.0490) (0.0418) (0.0861) (0.0478) 
firm_age 0.0687 0.2105** -0.0906 0.0548 0.1838** -0.1120 
 
(0.0715) (0.0933) (0.0897) (0.0725) (0.0927) (0.0887) 
ROA 1.7503 -10.4962** -0.2759 1.8762 -10.3978** -0.7005 
 
(3.2997) (4.6890) (3.1279) (3.3104) (4.6383) (3.1496) 
leverage 0.0156 0.0494** 0.0154 0.0159 0.0533** 0.0189 
 
(0.0163) (0.0245) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0247) (0.0154) 
R&D -8.0873 -1.3035 -10.4526* -8.4708 -0.8454 -9.2094* 
 
(8.0883) (6.6926) (5.4282) (7.7417) (6.6943) (5.0546) 
education -0.9975** -3.8106*** -1.6090*** -0.9842** -3.7823*** -1.6137*** 
 
(0.3869) (0.5827) (0.3654) (0.3852) (0.5827) (0.3640) 
competition -0.0741 -1.6228 -0.8573 0.0471 -1.6890 -0.7080 
 
(1.0139) (1.0468) (1.2822) (0.9571) (1.0517) (1.1673) 
local_protection 0.1031** 0.1663*** 0.1517*** 
   
 
(0.0431) (0.0552) (0.0551) 
   
property_right 
   
-0.1654 -0.4190 -0.3469 
    
(0.3460) (0.4634) (0.4068) 
local_price_protection 
   
0.7469** 0.3005 1.0239** 
    
(0.3571) (0.5035) (0.4457) 
legal interm inst devpt -1.2710*** -0.8104 -0.5688 
   
 
(0.4322) (0.6192) (0.6251) 
   
pop_intensity -1.3912 -5.5996** -6.6661*** -2.3820 -6.3314*** -6.8739*** 
 
(2.3355) (2.7006) (2.3606) (2.0400) (2.3730) (1.9523) 
unemployment -2.2694 -4.6480 -3.9185 -2.5320 -4.1226 -4.5371 
 
(3.4297) (5.1716) (4.4520) (3.6245) (5.3415) (4.5256) 
gdp_per_capita 0.0120 -0.5370*** -0.3177** -0.0443 -0.6234*** -0.3041** 
 
(0.1049) (0.1259) (0.1435) (0.1117) (0.1345) (0.1486) 
gdp_per_capita2 -0.0099 0.0496*** 0.0240 -0.0064 0.0557*** 0.0216 
 
(0.0119) (0.0116) (0.0152) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0162) 
       
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2297 1931 1967 2297 1931 1967 
R-squared 0.4113 0.6083 0.3955 0.4089 0.6061 0.3968 
Columns (1)-(3) show the OLS regressions with the logarithm of the amount of SO2, waste water and soot discharge as the dependent 
variable, respectively, where “legal interm inst devpt” is used as an alternative measure for property rights protection. “legal interm 
inst devpt” is an index that measures the development of legal intermediate institutions for each province, with higher values 
indicating better legal system development. Columns (4)-(6) show the OLS regressions with the logarithm of the amount of SO2, 
waste water and soot discharge as the dependent variable, respectively, where “local_price_protection” is used as an alternative 
measure for local protectionism. “local_price_protection” is an index that measures the degree of price protection by local government, 
with higher values indicating more local price protection. All of the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. Robust standard 
errors clustered with cities are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 1. Variable Definition and Data Source 
Variable Source Definition 
Pollutants   
SO2 China’s State  Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA) 2006, 
2007 
Amount of discharged SO2 (ton))/sales (100 million RMB) 
SO2_over Idem Amount of discharged SO2 over standards (ton)/sales (100 million 
RMB) 
wastewater Idem Amount of discharged wastewater ( ton)/sales (10,000 RMB) 
wastewater_over Idem Amount of discharged wastewater over standards (ton)/sales 
(10,000RMB) 
Soot Idem Amount of discharged soot (ton)/sales (100 million RMB) 
soot_over Idem Amount of discharged soot over standards (ton)/sales (100 million 
RMB) 
oxynitride Idem Amount of discharge oxynitride (ton)/sales (100million RMB) 
COD Idem Amount of chemical oxygen demand (COD) (ton)/ sales (100 million 
RMB) 
ammonia nitrogen Idem Amount of ammonia nitrogen (ton)/ sales(100 million RMB) 
 
Ownership 
  
SOE The First Economic Census of 
China (2005) 
Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is registered as state-owned enterprise, 
including alliances of SOEs and unlisted state-owned limited 
companies; =0, otherwise. 
foreign Idem Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is registered as joint ventures, 
cooperatives with HK, Macau, Taiwan (HMT) or foreign investors; or 
HMT wholly owned companies, HMT shareholding (limited) 
companies; or Wholly foreign owned companies; or Foreign 
shareholding (limited) companies; =0, otherwise. 
private Idem Dummy variable, =1 if the firms is registered as private limited 
companies, private shareholding companies, proprietorship or 
partnership company; =0, otherwise. 
public Idem Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is a public-listed company; =0, 
otherwise. 
collectives Idem Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is registered as collectives or alliances 
of collectives; =0, otherwise. 
limited Idem Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is registered as unlisted non-state-
owned limited companies; =0, otherwise. 
 
Firm-level Variables 
 
export The First Economic Census of China 
(2005) 
=total export/ total sales 
firm_size SEPA 2006 and 2007 the logarithm of the number of employees by the end of the year 
firm_age Idem the logarithm of the age of the firm 
ROA Idem =EBIT/Assets 
leverage Idem =Debt/Equity 
R&D The First Economic Census of China 
(2005) 
=R&D expenses/sales 
education The First Economic Census of China 
(2005) 
the ratio of number of employees with college diploma or higher 
degrees. 
 
Other Variables 
 
competition the NBS Enterprise Database Concentration Ratios calculated from NBS Enterprise Database. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) equals the sum of the squared 
market shares of each firm in the industry. Note that this index is a 
function of all firms’ market shares. HHI has lower limit zero in case 
of perfect competition (firms→∞ and shares→0) and upper limit of 
one in case of monopoly (1 firm with 100% share). 
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Appendix Table 1. (Cont’d) Variable Definition and Data Source 
Variable Source Definition 
local_protection the NERI Index of Marketization of 
China's Provinces 2006 Report 
Measurement to reduce local protection in product market, higher 
value indicates higher entry barrier, at province level measured for 
year 2003. 
property_right China Governance, Investment 
Climate, and Harmonious Society: 
Competitiveness Enhancements for 
120 Cities in China, by the World 
Bank (2006)  
Property right protection index, higher value indicates better property 
right protection, at city level measured for year 2003. 
pop_intensity China City Statistical Year Book 
(2006, 2007) 
= population (10,000) / land area (km2), at city level. 
unemployment Idem The unemployment rate at city level. 
gdp_per_capita Idem GDP per capita at city level (10,000RMB). 
gdp_per_capita2 Idem The squared term of GDP per capita at city level (10,000RMB). 
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Appendix Table 2. Cross-sample comparison on Firm Characteristics and Ownership  
SO2 emission sample 
           Firm Characteristics 
 
 Ownership 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
export 2297 0 0 0 
 
foreign 2297 0 0 0 
firm_size 2297 5.55 6.29 7.2 
 
private 2297 0 0 1 
firm_age 2297 2.08 2.56 3.22 
 
public 2297 0 0 0 
ROA 2297 0 0.01 0.01 
 
collectives 2297 0 0 0 
leverage 2297 0 0.08 0.55 
 
limited 2297 0 0 1 
R&D 2297 0 0 0 
 
          
           Non-inclusive SO2 sample 
          Firm Characteristics 
 
 Ownership 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
export 4715 0 0 0 
 
foreign 4798 0 0 0 
firm_size 3734 5.46 6.17 6.98 
 
private 4798 0 0 0 
firm_age 3728 2.08 2.48 3.18 
 
public 4798 0 0 0 
ROA 3203 0 0.01 0.01 
 
collectives 4798 0 0 0 
leverage 4599 0 0.05 0.54 
 
limited 4798 0 0 1 
R&D 4715 0 0 0  limited 4798 0 0 1 
           Waste water sample 
          Firm Characteristics 
 
 Ownership 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
export 1931 0 0 0.05 
 
foreign 1931 0 0 0 
firm_size 1931 5.69 6.39 7.29 
 
private 1931 0 0 0 
firm_age 1931 2.08 2.64 3.26 
 
public 1931 0 0 0 
ROA 1931 0 0.01 0.01 
 
collectives 1931 0 0 0 
leverage 1931 0 0.08 0.52 
 
limited 1931 0 0 1 
R&D 1931 0 0 0 
 
          
           Non-inclusive waste water  sample 
          Firm Characteristics 
 
 Ownership 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
export 5081 0 0 0 
 
foreign 5164 0 0 0 
firm_size 4100 5.44 6.12 6.93 
 
private 5164 0 0 0 
firm_age 4094 2.08 2.48 3.14 
 
public 5164 0 0 0 
ROA 3569 0 0.01 0.01 
 
collectives 5164 0 0 0 
leverage 4965 0 0.05 0.55 
 
limited 5164 0 0 1 
R&D 5081 0 0 0            
           Soot emission sample 
           Firm Characteristics 
 
 Ownership 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
export 1967 0 0 0 
 
foreign 1967 0 0 0 
firm_size 1967 5.6 6.38 7.28 
 
private 1967 0 0 0 
firm_age 1967 2.08 2.64 3.26 
 
public 1967 0 0 0 
ROA 1967 0 0.01 0.01 
 
collectives 1967 0 0 0 
leverage 1967 0 0.09 0.58 
 
limited 1967 0 0 1 
R&D 1967 0 0 0            
           Non-inclusive soot sample 
          Firm Characteristics 
 
 Ownership 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
 
Variable N P25 Median P75 
export 5045 0 0 0 
 
foreign 5128 0 0 0 
firm_size 4064 5.44 6.14 6.93 
 
private 5128 0 0 0 
firm_age 4058 2.08 2.48 3.18 
 
public 5128 0 0 0 
ROA 3533 0 0.01 0.01 
 
collectives 5128 0 0 0 
leverage 4929 0 0.05 0.53 
 
limited 5128 0 0 1 
R&D 5045 0 0 0            
Note: this table compares firm characteristics and ownership between pollutant (SO2, waste water or soot) emission sample 
and non-inclusive pollutant emission sample. 
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Appendix Figure 1. Number of Firms and The Industrial GDP  
 
Note: this figure depicts the correlation between the share (in percentage) of number of firms of each province in our final 
sample (x-axis) and the share (in percentage) of provincial industrial GDP in 2006 (y-axis). 
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Appendix Figure 2. The Map of China Cities on Sulfur Dioxide Discharge Intensity 
 
Note: The bigger the circle the more sulfur dioxide pollution in the indicated city. 
 
 
 
